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FROM KANSAS TO THE CONGO: WHY NAMING AND
SHAMING CORPORATIONS THROUGH THE DODDFRANK ACT'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
DISCLOSURE WON'T SOLVE A HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS
Marcia Narine*
ABSTRACT

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") serves to protect
investors, maintain fair and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation. With the passage of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act
regarding conflict minerals corporate governance disclosure, the agency
has entered into the human rights arena. Any company, regardless of
size, that files reports with the SEC must now ensure that they are not
funding rebel groups engaged in rape, torture, the use of child soldiers,
exploitation of child labor, or other activities that have, in part, led to
one of the world's largest and most protracted humanitarian crises. This
"name-and-shame" law, which does not actually make it illegal to source
minerals from the Congo, aims to provide transparency to consumers
and investors so that they can make informed choices about the
companies with which they choose to do business. On the surface, this
makes sense in an era in which companies are hyper-vigilant about their
reputations. Whether a corporation takes a shareholder or stakeholdercentric point of view, no firm can afford to be associated with
conscription of child soldiers or the rape of women and children.
This Article outlines corporate motivations for social responsibility
programs; the various voluntary industry corporate citizenship
initiatives; the state of corporate liability for human rights abuses prior
to the Dodd-Frank Act; the level of sexual violence in the Congo which
led to the legislation; the legislative history behind the conflict mineral
rule, including the involvement of civil society groups; the legal
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challenges to the rule; and some alternatives to the rule. The Article
contends that in a well-intentioned effort to help the people of the Congo,
the drafters of the law oversimplified the causes of the violence and
failed to adequately consider appropriate alternatives. Additionally, the
implementer of the law-the SEC-failed to adequately consider costs
and benefits. Companies, however, will conduct their own cost-benefit
analyses as it relates to reputation and legal risk. Many companies will
likely determine that pulling out of the Congo is in their best interest. As
a result, the Dodd-Frank Act may likely cause a de facto boycott of
buying minerals from the Congo, even if they are not tainted. Consumers
and investors will ultimately determine whether name-and-shame really
works.
The Article concludes that the Dodd-Frank conflict minerals rule is
a poor choice for the United States' first foray into human rights
legislation for corporations because the law's flaws will lead to
unintended and devastating consequences for the very beneficiaries it
intends to help-the Congolese people.
INTRODUCTION

For decades, academics and courts have debated the proper role of
corporations in society. To many, the corporation serves only to
maximize shareholder value.' Others criticize that definition as both
one-dimensional and outdated. To them, the corporation owes duties to a
broader group-the stakeholders, including employees, creditors, and
consumers. 2 Still others argue that states need to enact legislation
creating new corporate entities such as benefit corporations, low-profit
limited liability companies ("L3Cs"), and flexible purpose corporations.3
1 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Leo
E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek
Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (2012); Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The
Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6
(Magazine), at 32.
2
See LYNN

STOUT,
THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MYTH:
How PUTI'ING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 4, 6-7, 34-35
(2012).
3
See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations-A Sustainable Form of
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 593-606 (2011) (describing benefit
corporations); William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit CorporationsAre
Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations,38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 838 (2012)
(describing the need for benefit corporations); Susan Mac Cormac & Heather Haney, New
CorporateForms: One Viable Solution to Advancing Economic Sustainability,J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN., Spring 2012, at 49, 55 (supporting the flexible purpose corporation); J. Haskell
Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications and Benefit
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. Bus. L. REV. 1 (2012) (examining whether benefit
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They base their contentions in part on the fear that the pursuit of a
social mission over profit-maximization subjects directors to additional
liability, notwithstanding the existence of constituency statutes in
several states and the fact that the law generally allows corporations to
pursue lawful purposes including social benefits.4
In recent years, however, even the more traditional firms have
spent significant sums publicizing their social missions through the use
of corporate social responsibility ("CSR") programs., In 1999,
corporations issued about 500 nonfinancial reports, but, in 2003,
corporations produced more than 1,500 such reports. 6 By 2010, nearly
5,500 corporate responsibility reports were being published each year.7

corporations are really useful and proposing some improvements); J. Haskell Murray &
Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raisingand
Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 4
(2011).
4

Compare Clark & Babson, supra note 3, at 848-50 (describing how benefit
corporations give directors flexibility to pursue social goals while simultaneously holding
them accountable to those goals), with Murray & Hwang, supra note 3, at 35-36
(describing the latitude that directors have to act in favor of non-shareholders due to the
business judgment rule and various constituency statutes).
5 This Article defines CSR as the "commitment [of a business] to contribute to
sustainable economic development, working with employees, their families, the local
community, and society at large to improve their quality of life." WORLD Bus. COUNCIL FOR
SUSTAINABLE

DEV.,

CROSS-CUTTING

THEMES

5

(2003),

available

at

http://

www.wbcsd.chlDocRoot/7ApjAGOYjGBKx83eok6O/cross-cutting.pdf; see also Henri Servaes
& Ane Tamayo, The Impact of CorporateSocial Responsibility on Firm Value: The Role of
Customer Awareness, MGMT.
Sol.
(forthcoming
2013),
available at http://
mansci.journal.informs.org/content/early/2013/01/08/mnsc. 1120.1630.full.pdf
(discussing
various definitions of CSR but adopting the definition by the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development). Another appropriate definition is "a business organization's
configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and
policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal
relationships." Noam Noked, Investing in Corporate Social Responsibility to Enhance
Customer Value, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 28, 2011,
9:31 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2011/02/28/investing-in-corporate-socialresponsibility-to-enhance-customer-value/ (quoting Donna J. Wood, Corporate Social
Performance Revisited, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 691, 693 (1991)).
6
AsS'N OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCOuNTANTS & CORPORATEREGISTER.COM,
TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY: PROGRESS ON GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 2004, at 8,

available at http://www.corporateregister.com/pdflTowardsTransparency.pdf. Nonfinancial
reports include reports concerning CSR, the environment, sustainable development, and
other social or community issues. Id. at 5.
7
Press Release, CorporateRegister.com, Voting Opens for CR Reporting Awards
2012
(Oct.
24, 2010),
available at http://www.corporateregister.com/crra/help/
CRRA12PressRelease.pdf.
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To varying degrees, these firms have tried to find a way to pursue a
societal benefit while creating economic value. 8 Perhaps in recognition of
the public benefit of adopting more of a stakeholder view, the CEO of one
of the world's largest hospitality groups began his corporate
responsibility report for 2011 by asking the question, "What is the role of
hotels in 21st century society?"
CSR programs vary by industry and may tout sustainable economic
development, ethical sourcing, community engagement, fair working
conditions, and other factors that either cause employees, consumers,
and members of the public to have positive feelings about the corporation
or help the firm rehabilitate a bruised corporate image. 10 At least
publicly, CSR is now the "[n]ew [b]usiness [n]orm."11
Cynical observers have labeled some of these efforts "faux CSR,"12
while others have studied the CSR "halo effect" in which consumers
blindly make decisions about a company based solely on what they have
heard about one aspect of a company's CSR program.13 This halo effect
may cause consumers, for example, to assume that a company that
bottles its products in recycled plastic also treats its employees more
fairly than other employers. 4

8
See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to
Reinvent Capitalism-andUnleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARv. Bus. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 62, 64-65 (arguing that "societal needs, not just conventional economic
needs, define markets" and that companies should have societal issues at the "core," not
the "periphery").

9

INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GRP., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 1 (2012),

available at http://www.ihgplc.com/files/pdf2011_ cr report.pdf.
10 See generally WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: MAKING GOOD BUSINESS SENSE 6-7, 10-11, 19 (2000), available at
http://www.wbcsd.org/web/publications/csr2000.pdf.
11 See Markus Funk & Elizabeth Banzhoff, Corporate Social Responsibility: The
New Business Norm, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.corporate
(observing
complianceinsights.com/corporate-social-responsibility-the-new-business-norm/
that, in addition to bribery and corruption laws, companies need to contend with the
Executive Order on Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking in Persons in Federal
Contracts, SEC conflict minerals rules, and the California Transparency in Supply Chains
Act).
12 See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking
Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L.
REV. 983, 985, 999-1009 (2011) (discussing corporate social responsibility and
greenwashing in the context of the BP oil spill).
13 See N.
Craig Smith et al., Consumer Perceptions of Corporate Social
Responsibility: The CSR Halo Effect 4, 16-17 (INSEAD Soc. Innovation Ctr., Working
Paper No. 16, 2010), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1577000.
14
See id. at 17 ("The CSR halo effect suggests consumers might extrapolate from a
small number of examples of CSR-related practices.").
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Despite questions from some skeptics about the motivations for CSR
efforts and the fact that the literature is inconclusive as to the extent of
the benefits, corporations generally gain some public relations advantage
from discussing how they address the triple bottom line-people, profits,
and planet.15 But sometimes that effort may not be enough.
Notwithstanding its comprehensive global responsibility reports touting
awards for pursuing sustainability, respecting employees, and
benefitting the environment,16 Wal-Mart, the nation's largest employer,17
has been besieged by employment lawsuits, foreign bribery
investigations, and opposition from grassroots organizations against its
antiunion stance and its opening of new stores.18 Nonetheless, Wal-Mart
still remains one of the most profitable companies in the world, and it is

15 See John Elkington, Enter the Triple Bottom Line, in THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE:
DOES IT ALL ADD UP? 1, 1-2 (Adrian Henriques & Julie Richardson eds., 2004) (discussing
the origin of the term "triple bottom line"). For example, some research indicates that
businesses gain increased customer loyalty, the ability to charge higher prices, and lower
reputational risk, which aids them in times of crisis, as a result of their CSR efforts,
leading to increased profitability in the long run. Noked, supra note 5; see also Janet E.
Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the Business
Judgment Rule Protects a Board's Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 664-65 (2007) (reviewing studies measuring the relationship
between CSR and consumer reactions to the company); Servaes & Tamayo, supra note 5, at
2 (observing that CSR and firm value are positively correlated for firms with high customer
awareness based on advertising expenditures and that, for firms with low customer
awareness, the relation is either negative or insignificant); Robert G. Eccles et al., The
Impact of a Corporate Culture of Sustainability on Corporate Behavior and Performance
5-7 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-035, 2011) (comparing ninety "High
Sustainability"companies that were early and voluntary adopters of environmental and
social policies and that use these measures as governance practices with ninety "Low
Sustainability" companies or traditional companies, and finding that, over an eighteenyear period, sustainable firms outperform traditional firms in terms of both stock market
and accounting performance).
16 See WALMART, BEYOND 50 YEARS: BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 114-15
(2012) (listing Wal-Mart's 2011 awards and recognitions, including ones for environmental
care, social responsibility, and sustainability).
17 Lesley Wexler, Wal-Mart Matters, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 95, 95 (2011).
1s See GEOFFREY HEAL, WHEN PRINCIPLES PAY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE BOTTOM LINE 113, 116, 128 (2008); see also, e.g., Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.
2541, 2547 (2011) (addressing a class action suit against Wal-Mart); David Barstow, Vast
Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
22, 2012, at Al (discussing allegations of bribery within Wal-Mart's Mexican subsidiary);
Andrew Martin, Female Wal-Mart Employees File a New Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,
2011, at B3 (discussing discrimination cases against Wal-Mart). Wal-Mart products have
also been linked to factories with sub-par safety standards resulting in the deaths of
factory employees from fires. Steven Greenhouse, Documents Indicate Walmart Blocked
Safety Push in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2012, at A16.
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likely that its investments in CSR have benefited it.'9 Further, the
evidence is mounting that despite what consumers say about their
desires to do business with socially responsible enterprises, convenience
and price eventually win out when it comes to actual purchasing
decisions. 20
Perhaps because of the public pressure to do more, many of the
world's most powerful transnational corporations ("TNCs") engage in a
number of voluntary initiatives on their own or with industry peers
either to win public and consumer support or to forestall more onerous
legislation in home or host countries. TNCs that sign on to voluntary
industry initiatives, however, have no accountability other than public
scrutiny or expulsion from the voluntary initiative.21
International human rights laws generally have focused on
protecting citizens from their states, but we are now seeing a shift to
focusing on TNCs' roles in protecting human rights. 22 Legally, at least,
the states-not TNCs-have traditionally been charged with the main
responsibility for protecting human rights. 23 But observers, such as
nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"), socially responsible investors
controlling trillions in assets under management, 24 activists, media

19 See HEAL, supra note 18, at 114, 128-30 (discussing Wal-Mart's efficiency and
recent steps toward social responsibility).
20 See GUARDIAN, CONSUMER ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS ON SUSTAINABILITY 8

(2010), available at http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2010/06/11/
GSiJun2010.pdf (indicating that environmental factors are important, but that price,
availability, and quality matter more to consumers).
21 When reputation is an asset, firms are especially susceptible to pressure and
scrutiny from activist groups. See VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE
SECTOR 27 (2001). The U.N. Global Compact, for example, has expelled over 3,000
companies for failing to report on their progress towards achieving the Compact's ten
principles. See UN Global Compact Has Expelled over 3,000 Companies, UNITED NATIONS
GLOBAL COMPACT (Feb. 9, 2012), http://unglobalcompact.org/news/188-02-09-2012. This,
however, is a purely voluntary initiative, and there are no civil, criminal, or monetary
penalties. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
22 See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 3 (2010).
23 Eric de Brabandere, Non-state Actors and Human Rights: Corporate
Responsibility and the Attempts to Formalizethe Role of Corporationsas Participantsin the
International Legal System, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM:
MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 268, 271 (Jean
d'Aspremont ed., 2011).
24 See Soc. INV. FORUM FOUND., 2010 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2010), available at http://
www.socialinvest.org/resources/pubs/trends/documents/201OTrendsES.pdf (noting that one
out of every eight dollars invested in the United States is geared toward sustainable and
socially responsible investing). The simplest form of socially responsible investing is
portfolio-screening whereby an investor identifies ethically unacceptable investments and
excludes those investments from her portfolio. Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Socially
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outlets, consumers, and labor organizations, have long called on TNCs to
re-examine their behavior in the states in which they operate. 25 Some
use cooperative initiatives and some employ public "name-and-shame"
campaigns. 26 Intergovernmental organizations, such as the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") and the United
Nations ("U.N."), have issued influential, albeit nonbinding, guidance to
TNCs as well. 27 While NGOs and intergovernmental organizations' focus
on TNCs have typically been for environmental regulations, the spotlight
has more recently turned to garnering TNC participation in human
rights issues. 28
TNCs no longer have the luxury of choosing to volunteer to be
socially responsible, at least as it relates to human rights, because those
that file reports under Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act ("Exchange Act") 2 9 and that meet certain other criteria described in
this Article must now enter a new realm between the hard and soft law3o
governance. Prodded by former U.S. Senator Sam Brownback of
Kansas, 3' the U.S. government recently enacted a law legislating human
Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1992).
25 See HAUFLER, supra note 21, at 11, 107 (discussing the power of activists and
socially conscious consumers to influence businesses); DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR
VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 9-10 (2005)

(mentioning the shift of NGOs from lobbying politicians to lobbying executives).
26 For example,
change.org has launched several highly publicized online
campaigns to promote citizen activism against well-known firms. See CHANGE.ORG,
http://www.change.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). In another example, European NGOs
have asked Apple, Samsung, and others to disclose how they source their tin from
Indonesia's Bangka Island because of the potential deforestation and the effect on the local
fishermen's livelihoods following a six-month investigation by Friends of the Earth.
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, MINING FOR SMARTPONES: THE TRUE COST OF TIN 3-4 (2012),

availableat http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/tin-mining.pdf.
27 See infra Part I.B-C. The OECD has thirty-four member countries, including the
United States, and supports policies improving the social and economic conditions of people
worldwide, including people of nonmember states. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev.
[OECD], Better Policies for Better Lives: The OECD at 50 and Beyond, at 8 (2011), available
at http://www.oecd.org/about/47747755.pdf. The U.N. currently has 193 member states.
Membership of Principal UN Organs, UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/
en/members/pomembership.shtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
28 See Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and
Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 78 (2002).
29 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(a), 15(d), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(a), 780(d)
(West 2009; Supp. 2012 & Supp. 1A 2012).
30 Soft laws are neither legally binding "nor completely void of any legal
significance." MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-53 (4th ed.

2003). Soft law is meant to be transitory, but when it hardens, it becomes customary
international law. See id.
31
156 CONG. REC. S3,655-56 (daily ed. May 12, 2010).
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rights through corporate governance disclosure-Section 1502 of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("DoddFrank Act").32 Unrelated to the Dodd-Frank Act's broader goal of
preventing financial crisis, the conflict mineral provisions of the DoddFrank Act are meant to focus investor and consumer attention on
potential corporate complicity in human rights abuses primarily in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo ("DRC" or "Congo"),33 a country with
the world's largest concentration of U.N. Peacekeeping troops.34
On August 22, 2012, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") finalized Rule 13 p-1, which requires domestic and
foreign companies (regardless of size) that already file reports with the
SEC to conduct due diligence and report on Form SD the origin of
certain minerals in their products if those minerals originated in the
DRC or adjoining countries.35 The purpose of the reporting is to ensure
that they are not funding dangerous rebel groups that engage in rape,
torture, the use of child soldiers, exploitation of children, and other
activities that have, in part, led to one of the world's largest and most
protracted humanitarian crises.36 This law, which went into effect on
November 13, 2012,37 aims to provide transparency to consumers and
investors so that they can make informed choices about companies.38
32 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1502, 15
U.S.C. § 78m(p) (Supp. V 2011) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
3 See id. § 1502(a); Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,275 (Sept. 12, 2012)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b). The Democratic Republic of the Congo will be
called the "DRC" or "Congo" in this Article and is not to be confused with the adjacent
country called the Republic of Congo.
34
PeacekeepingFact Sheet, UNITED NATIONS (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml [hereinafter Peacekeeping Fact Sheet].
3
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,275, 56,362, 56,356. The term "adjoining
country" is defined in the Act as "a country that shares an internationally recognized
border with the [DRC]." Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(e)(1). Presently, the adjoining countries of
the DRC include Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo,
Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at
56,275 n.7.
36 See Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(a); Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,275-76,
56,365.
37 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,274. Compliance with the rule must begin
on January 1, 2013. Id.
3
One article has called Section 1502 "a regulatory experiment in information
extraction" because companies operating in the DRC may have to go all the way through
their supply chains to get information because they themselves may lack the crucial
information about the source of minerals in their products. Christiana Ochoa & Patrick J.
Keenan, Regulating Information Flows, Regulating Conflict: An Analysis of United States
Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT'L L. 129, 140, 147-48 (2011) (noting
also that, when companies discover that their minerals may contribute to the conflict, they
may have disincentives to fully comply with reporting initiatives given the consequences,
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Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act was predicted to affect an
estimated 6,000 companies39-almost half of all U.S. publicly traded
companies directly subject to SEC regulation40-and hundreds of
thousands of suppliers because almost every consumer product that
requires electronics uses one of the four regulated minerals collectively
known as the "3Ts+G."41 Specifically, these are: (1) columbite-tantalite,
from which tantalum may be extracted, which is used for cell phones,
computers, surgical implants, and wind turbines; (2) cassiterite, from
which tin may be extracted, which is used in coating for food cans,
solders, catalysts, and stabilizers; (3) wolframite, from which tungsten
may be extracted and used for light bulbs, aerospace components, and
machine tools; or (4) gold, which is used as an electronic conductor, for
jewelry, and in medical equipment and anti-lock brakes. 42 Large
companies must make their first disclosures in May 2014 for activities
occurring in calendar year 2013.43 The reporting will have a dramatic
effect on the companies because some companies can have 10,000 to
50,000 suppliers and several layers in their supply chains.44

including, among other things, consumer boycotts, and that even though over time Section
1502 may eventually improve conditions in the DRC, companies may choose to divest from
the region, which may lead to even more conflict).
3
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,336.
40 See KPMG INT'L, CONFLICT MINERALS AND BEYOND: PART TWO: A MORE
TRANSPARENT SUPPLY CHAIN 1 (2012), available at http://www.kpmg.com/Globallen/Issues
Andlnsights/ArticlesPublications/conflict-minerals/Documents/conflict-minerals-beyond-pa
rt-two.pdf. The law did not make de minimis exceptions for the metals; accordingly, many
more companies are affected than would otherwise have been impacted by the legislation.
See MORGAN LEWIS, SEC ADOPTS RULES IMPLEMENTING THE DODD-FRANK
REQUIREMENT

FOR

CONFLICT

MINERALS

REPORTING

at http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/Securities_WhitePaper
Sep2012.pdf.
41

2

(2012),

available

ConflictMineralsReporting-

JOE DILEO ET AL., DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, CONFLICT MINERALS-THE SUPPLY

CHAIN'S WEAKEST LINK? 3 (2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates[Local%20Content/Articles/AERS/Financial%2OStatement%20&%20Internal
%20Control%2OAudit%20%28FSICA%29/Accounting-Standards-Communicationslus-aers
headsup_112911.pdf.
42 See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,275; Opening Brief of
Petitioners 6-7,
Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 2013); Edward Wyatt, Behind
the Blood Money: Debate Grows over Use of Minerals Mined in Strife-Torn Areas, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, at B1. Apple alone has identified 218 of its suppliers that use the
affected minerals to manufacture components and the 175 smelters that those minerals
come from. See APPLE, APPLE SUPPLIER RESPONSIBILITY: 2012 PROGRESS REPORT 11 (2012),

available at http://www.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdflAppleSR_2012_Progress
Report.pdf.
1
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,274.
44 Opening Brief of Petitioners 9-11, Nat'1 Ass'n of Mfrs., No. 12-1422.
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Additionally, their suppliers can have multiple levels and subcontractors
themselves within their own supply chains.45
Significantly, the law does not prohibit the use of conflict minerals.
It merely requires companies to disclose whether they are using them
and, if so, perform a due diligence examination of the source of those
minerals and provide a description of the products manufactured that
are not "DRC conflict free."46 This "name-and-shame" law depends on
consumers and investors to pressure the firms-especially those that
depend on CSR programs to enhance their images-to change their
business practices. 47 Many industry groups representing businesses have
sued the SEC, arguing, among other things, that the agency failed to
take into account the appropriate cost-benefit analysis.48
45

Id.

Dodd-Frank Act § 1502; Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,274, 56,281,
56,363-64 (providing a temporary transition period during which issuers may use the term
"DRC conflict undeterminable" if they cannot make the determination for one of two
specified reasons).
7 See DUDLEY W. MURREY ET AL., ANDREWS KURTH LLP, SEC ADOPTs DODDFRANK CONFLICT MINERALS RULE 1 (2012), available at http://www.andrewskurth.com/
assets/pdflarticle 920.pdf. Naming and shaming has had mixed success in other contexts.
Naming and shaming countries that enable human trafficking has been largely ineffective.
See Karen E. Bravo, Follow the Money? Does the International Fight Against Money
Laundering Provide a Model for InternationalAnti-human Trafficking Efforts?, 6 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 138, 140 (2008). California's Transparency in the Supply Chains Act of 2010
§ 3, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West Supp. 2013), which examines slave labor and human
trafficking in the supply chain, requires online disclosures, though a study found that onequarter of apparel companies are noncompliant, and the majority make valueless vague
disclosures. Univ. of Del., Apparel Industry Study, UDAILY (Apr. 12, 2012, 8:08 AM),
http://www.udel.eduludaily/2012/apr/ apparel-compliance-04 1212.html. As an example of
naming and shaming being an ineffective means of deterrence, sex offender registries may
actually increase crime by making a noncriminal lifestyle less appealing. See J.J. Prescott
& Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal
Behavior?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161, 192 (2011) (identifying sex offenders to local residents may
increase recidivism, although mere registration of offenders might decrease crime). In fact,
JohnTV (an organization that attempts to discourage street prostitution by filming and
posting Johns with prostitutes online), About, JOHNTV.CoM, http://johntv.comlabout (last
visited Mar. 8, 2013), is a particularly poor tool for rehabilitation and specific deterrence.
See Courtney Guyton Persons, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency,
Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes'
Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1547 (1996). But hygiene grade cards in Los Angeles
County were successful in decreasing food-borne illness by thirteen percent. E.g., Paul A.
Simon et al., Impact of Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards on Foodborne-Disease
Hospitalizations in Los Angeles County, J. ENvTL. HEALTH, Mar. 2005, at 32, 34. Public
shame was also useful in changing international consensus for landmines. Lesley Wexler,
The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm
Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty, 20
ARIz. J. INVL & COMP. L. 561, 572-74 (2003).
48 See Petition for Review at 1-2, Nat? Ass'n of Mfrs., No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
19, 2012). On November 21, 2012, the petitioners filed a Preliminary Statement of Issues.
46

2013]

FROM KANSAS TO THE CONGO

361

This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I briefly discusses the
current duties that U.S. corporations have in the human rights context
and the quasi-legal landscape in which TNCs operated until the passage
of the Dodd-Frank Act. Part II describes the human rights crisis in the
DRC and the history behind the legislation. Part III argues that the
law's flaws make it a poor choice for the United States' first foray into
human rights legislation for corporations. This Part also outlines the
legal challenges filed by business groups and the intervention by NGOs,
and it points out that the SEC's failure to conduct an appropriate costbenefit analysis will lead to severe unintended consequences that will
harm the very people that the law was designed to help. As other
countries and U.S. cities and college campuses are considering how they
can help stem the tide of violence, they would do well to consider the
impact that their solutions could have on the recipients of their
assistance. Part TV concludes that a name-and-shame governance
disclosure is a well-intentioned but wrong solution for a country as
volatile as the DRC, due to the instability of the region, the fragility of
the host state, and the failure of the international community to
implement a comprehensive, multi-pronged sustainable approach to a
humanitarian crisis.
Notably, to date, the European Union has not yet passed a similar
law, nor have any Asian countries, which house many of the world's
largest smelters and which play an integral role in the supply chain of
the conflict minerals process. The lack of a coordinated global effort with
measurable incentives for corporations to move beyond voluntary
initiatives will also undermine the intent of the law. 4 9 If corporations are
Preliminary Statement of Issues at 1-3, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
21, 2012). The petitioners argue that the SEC failed to meet its statutory obligations to
consider the effects of its rule; misinterpreted the statute and arbitrarily rejected
alternatives that would have significantly reduced costs; and enacted a rule that compels
speech in violation of the First Amendment. Id.
The business groups succeeded on this cost-benefit analysis argument in a proxyaccess case in 2011 when the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found
that the SEC's rule was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.
See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The author has
signed on to an amicus brief in support of the petitioners in the conflict minerals litigation
specifically as it relates to the unintended adverse effects on the Congolese people and not
as it relates to the commercial interests of the business community. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Support of Petitioners, Nat'l
Ass'n of Mfrs., No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2013).
49
The European Union, however, will be meeting to consider Dodd-Frank Act type
regulation of conflict minerals; moreover, for audit purposes, if the European Union
imposes due diligence standards, it may allow the use of the OECD Due Diligence
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk
Areas. See Resolution of 13 December 2012 on the Situation in the Democratic Republic of
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to have a role in stemming a humanitarian crisis, the role should be
commensurate with the responsibility. Although the popular narrative
surrounding the Dodd-Frank Act has focused on corporate and
consumer demand for minerals that fund rebel forces engaged in rape,
pillage, and conscription of child soldiers, the situation is much more
complex, which makes the SEC's failure to have conducted the costbenefit analysis all the more critical. If the government chooses to
engage in future human rights governance legislation for businesses, the
Dodd-Frank Act should not serve as the model.
I. LIFE FOR TNCs BEFORE THE DODD-FRANK ACT
A. Soft Law Governance and CorporateResponsibility for Human Rights
Forty-two out of the top 100 economic entities in the world are
corporations,50 yet they do not bear the responsibilities of nation-states.
In many instances, TNCs have as much power and influence as a nationstate vis-A-vis the local population; yet, as one scholar has observed, they
have the ability to act as mere bystanders. 5 1When corporations, at least
in the United States, enjoy some of the legal benefits of "personhood" 52
and the power of nation-states, what level of responsibility should they
have for human rights abuses? Without specific laws to bind them, are
voluntary industry initiatives or notions of moral responsibility enough
to change corporate behavior? What is the role of the private, non-state

the Congo, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.europarl.europa.
euldocumentlactivities/cont/201301/20130109ATT58700/20130109ATT58700EN.pdf.
See
generally OECD, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (2d ed. 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/
daf/inv/mne/ GuidanceEdition2.pdf.
Canada is also looking to legislate the use of conflict minerals. In March 2013, the
New Democratic Party proposed a bill based on the OECD Guidelines and which aims to
improve and build on the Dodd-Frank Act. lain Marlow, NDP to Introduce Federal Bill on
26, 2013,
12:42
PM),
http://
(Mar.
Conflict Minerals, GLOBE & MAIL
www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/tech-news/ndp-to-introduce-federal-bill-on-conflict-m
inerals/articlel0319230/. A similar bill failed to pass in 2011. Id.
5o This is based on an estimate from a 2010 study. See TRACEY KEYS & THOMAS
MALNIGHT, GLOBAL TRENDS, CORPORATE CLOUT DISTRIBUTED: THE INFLUENCE OF THE
WORLD'S LARGEST 100 ECONOMIC ENTITIES 2 (2010), available at http://www.
globaltrends.com/?Itemid=87.
51 See Jena Martin Amerson, What's in a Name? Transnational Corporations as
Bystanders Under InternationalLaw, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 5 (2011) (arguing that, at its
heart, the TNC's bystander strategy maintains that TNCs, in the wake of accusations from
human rights advocates, are merely bystanders (i.e., innocent third parties) to the
underlying events, helpless to stop the tragedy from occurring).
52 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) (treating corporations
as persons for the purpose of First Amendment free speech).
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frameworks (also known as "civil regulations") relying on market-based
penalties in governing TNCs and their supply chains?
While the states have duties to protect their citizens, under a
minimalist approach, corporations are often seen as having negative
duties to do no harm.5 3 Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, domestic law had
less power to regulate these entities from a human rights perspective,
notwithstanding the great power that the TNCs wielded overseas.54
Similarly, international law provides no real answers for corporate
culpability because TNCs have no direct obligations under international
law.5 6 Further, corporations cannot be prosecuted in international
criminal courts, and currently there are no provisions in treaties
creating international criminal courts for the prosecution of
corporations.56 The lack of accountability, particularly in developing
5
Florian Wettstein, Silence as Complicity: Elements of a CorporateDuty to Speak
out Against the Violationof Human Rights, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 37, 38 (2012).
Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social
54 See Barnali
Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 631, 674 (2009) ("The
growing dominance of multinational corporations has also given greater importance to
issues of social responsibility. Multinational corporations have become as integral as states
in protecting and respecting the rights of individuals."); Stephens, supra note 28, at 54
("Multinational corporations have long outgrown the legal structures that govern them,
reaching a level of transnationality and economic power that exceeds domestic law's ability
to impose basic human rights norms."). In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States
had the opportunity to rule as a substantive matter on whether corporations could be held
liable for human rights abuses abroad under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2006), but chose to carry the case over to the following term for briefing on broader
jurisdictional grounds. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738, 1738
(2012) (mem.). The plaintiffs in this case claim that because international oil companies
aided and abetted the Nigerian military's human rights abuses, those companies should
face charges and civil liability in a U.S. court. Brief for Petitioners at 2-3, 8-9, Kiobel, 132
S. Ct. 1738 (Dec. 14, 2011). As of the time of this writing the case has not yet been decided.
See Docket for Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., SUP. CT. U.S., http://
www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=%2fdocketfiles%2fl0-1491.htm (last visited
Mar. 8, 2013). By 2010, in the United States, plaintiffs had filed more than 140 lawsuits
against corporations under the Alien Tort Statute. See Jonathan Drimmer, Human Rights
and the Extractive Industries: Litigationand Compliance Trends, 3 J. WORLD ENERGY L. &
Bus. 121, 122 (2010).
55 See Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect
and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, 1 1, Human Rights Council,
U.N. Doc. AfHRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Ruggie Report] ('The
international community is still in the early stages of adapting the human rights regime to
provide more effective protection to individuals and communities against corporate-related
human rights harm."); de Brabandere, supra note 23, at 271-72.
56 Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations:
Confusion in the Courts, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 304, 315 (2008). Historically,
individual culpability has been required for criminal prosecution. For example, after World
War II, prosecutors tried officials from the German firms Farben and Krupp for war crimes
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nations, allows some TNCs, which have the economic power of nationstates, to take advantage of the fact that the host-state government has
lax or unenforced labor, freedom of association, and antidiscrimination
laws. While, presumably, international law would apply to the TNC
wherever it is, the domestic law in the host country may provide for
fewer obligations or sanctions. Particularly in a weak or failing state, the
host country may have less resources or political will to prosecute a large
and powerful TNC that provides significant revenue and jobs for the
local population.57 Firms may choose to do business in the nations that
are the most lax and that have in fact won the regulatory "race to the
bottom."5 8
To be fair, TNCs can provide desperately needed employment,
which would otherwise not exist for the local citizens.59 But when a fire
broke out in a Bangladesh factory in 2012 killing over a hundred
workers sewing garments for Sears, Wal-Mart, and other well-known
American and European companies, those firms, cognizant of their
public images, rushed to distance themselves from the factory's poor
safety practices and their own suppliers, which they claimed
subcontracted the work without the knowledge or approval of the client
companies.60 Despite hundreds of workers being killed over the past
decade, Bangladeshi garment factories have over four-million employees,
and the industry is critical to the Bangladeshi economy.61

related to strengthening the Nazi regime. Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business with the
Devil: The Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate Officials Whose Business Transactions
Facilitate War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F. L. REV. 167, 183-89 (2005).
The court required evidence of personal involvement and knowledge and held that liability
needed to be predicated on evidence that "establishes some positive conduct" that
"constitutes ordering, approving, authorizing or joining" in criminal acts. Id. at 183, 189. In
doing this, the court refused to hinge individual convictions on the companies' actions as a
whole. Id. at 184, 188-89.
57
See de Brabandere, supra note 23, at 270 (describing powerful corporations in
weak states).
58 The regulatory race to the bottom is often considered a pejorative term assigned
to nations that may or may not be member states of the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), where governments want to attract businesses to their jurisdictions and,
therefore, lower taxes and relax environmental and labor regulations. See JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 196 (1st ed. 2006).
59 See JOHAN NORBERG, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 211, 216-18 (Roger
Tanner & Julian Sanchez trans., rev. ed. 2003) (discussing how multinational corporations
provide important wage-earning opportunities).
60 See Jim Yardley, Recalling Fire's Horror and Exposing Global Brands' Safety
Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2012, at Al.
61 Julfikar Ali Manik & Jim Yardley, Bangladesh Finds Gross Negligence in
Factory Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, at A4.
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The CSR efforts in the host countries may mask or compensate for
more deeply entrenched or historical abuses. For example, ExxonMobil,
one of the largest companies in the world, 62 has made the eradication of
malaria in Africa and the empowerment of women in Africa (particularly
in Chad) two of its social mission priorities. 63 However, some of
ExxonMobil's past dealings in Africa belie its support of nation-building
abroad. In 2006, it reportedly cooperated with the government of Chad to
break funding covenants with both the World Bank and the U.S.
government, which had sought to prohibit Chad from buying weapons
with outside aid, because ExxonMobil's interests were better served by
preventing a disruption to its supply of oil.64 That year, ExxonMobil
transferred about $774 million to the Chadian government.6 5 By
comparison, the entire U.S. budget for aid to Chad was only about one
percent of ExxonMobil's revenue stream to the African nation.66
Firms operate with impunity in weak or fragile states because these
host states do not have the power or will to respect their own citizens'
rights or to enforce labor or environmental laws (to the extent they exist)
against powerful TNCs.67 Because the TNCs have such power and
influence, many argue that TNCs should have commensurate
responsibility regarding social issues, especially related to human
rights.6 8 In some instances, TNCs have entered into agreements with
organizations, or NGOsindustry groups, intergovernmental
nonbinding initiatives, which may not do as much as they should to help
the indigenous peoples that are actually affected in the long term.6 9
CSR is rooted in the 1970s, when activists advocated greater
government control of corporations to ensure responsibility. 70 Outside

The Global 2000, FORBES, May 7, 2012, at 99, 99-100, 102.
See EXXONMOBIL, 2011 CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP REPORT 29 (2011), available
at http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/Files/news-pub-ccr20ll.pdf;
Community
&
Development, Our Focus Areas, EXXONMOBIL, http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/
community womenfocusarea.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
64 See STEVE COLL, PRIVATE EMPIRE: ExxONMOBIL AND AMERICAN POWER 358, 362
(2012).
65 Id. at 352-53.
62

63

66

Id.

See de Brabandere, supra note 23, at 270.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
69 See VOGEL, supra note 25, at 155-56 (discussing financial companies that
adopted voluntary principles to protect indigenous peoples).
70 See HAUFLER, supra note 21, at 15 (discussing the international trend towards
regulating corporations in the 1970s); URSULA MUHLE, THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE RISE OF A GLOBAL BUSINESS NORM 18-19 (2010) (noting failed
attempts in the 1970s to institutionalize CSR); Douglas M. Branson, CorporateGovernance
67

68
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forces also pressured companies to affect social change. For example, in
one of the first CSR initiatives, companies opposed to apartheid in South
Africa adopted the Sullivan Principles in the late 1970s and 1980s, and
in 1999 the code evolved into the Global Sullivan Principles by which
companies agreed to treat all employees the same regardless of race,
color, or gender.71 Around the same time, college students began
pressuring universities to divest from companies that conducted
business in South Africa, and cities and states began passing selective
purchasing laws ending contracts with companies doing business in
South Africa. 72 Today, the Global Sullivan Principles apply to economic
situations worldwide 7

B. OECD Guidelines and National Contact Points
Companies also adhere to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, which are voluntary principles
consistent
with
internationally recognized standards for governments to encourage
responsible business practices.74 Areas the guidelines cover include
employment and industrial relations, human rights, environment,
information disclosure, bribery, consumer interests, science and
technology, competition, and taxation for participating governments and
multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering countries.75

'Reform" and the New CorporateSocial Responsibility, 62 U. PITr. L. REV. 605, 611 (2001)
(discussing the origins of the CSR movement).
71 See HAUFLER, supra note 21, at 17-18.
72 E.g., David G. Savage, Students Favor Divestment but Shun Boycott of Products:
Scope of S. Africa Protests Questioned, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1986, Part II, at 1 (noting that
thirty-nine colleges "divested themselves of all stock in companies" operating in South
Africa and that some cities and states distanced themselves from South African products
as well).
73 Henry J. Richardson III, Reverend Leon Sullivan's Principles, Race, and
InternationalLaw: A Comment, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 55, 70 (2001). The standards
of other well-regarded soft law voluntary initiatives to which companies subscribe include
those found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ILO Conventions, and ISO
26000, but, due to space limitations, this Article will not discuss them. For an overview
discussing businesses and human rights, see Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, Addendum: Business Recognition of Human Rights: Global Patterns,
Regional and Sectoral Variations, 1 14, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/4/35/Add.4 (Feb. 8, 2007); ADRIAN HENRIQUES, STANDARDS FOR CHANGE?: ISO
26000 AND
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
31
(2012),
available at
http://
pubs.iied.org/pdfs/1651311ED.pdf.
7 See OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, at 3 (2011) [hereinafter
OECD, Guidelines], available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/
guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/48004323.pdf.
75 Id. at 27-63.
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Adhering governments must provide National Contact Points,
which serve as an avenue of redress for stakeholders.76 Although the
National Contact Points may conduct voluntary mediations or facilitate
conciliations between parties, critics complain that there are no
consequences for failing to comply and that TNCs often demand strict
confidentiality in mediations, which means that the Guidelines are
largely ineffective. Further, there are no global standards or uniform
processes for National Contact Points. Critics contend that the OECD
process, therefore, provides ample opportunity for some TNCs to appear
socially responsible without true accountability. 7
C. U.N. Global Compact,Draft Norms, and the Ruggie "Protect,Respect
and Remedy" Framework
As early as 1972, the U.N. Economic and Social Council solicited a
study on the role of the corporation and its impact on development.78 In
1998, the U.N. Norms Working Group on the Working Methods and
Activities of Transnational Corporations was established "[tio make
recommendations and proposals relating to the methods of work and
activities of transnational corporations in order to ensure that such
methods and activities are in keeping with the economic and social
objectives of the countries in which they operate."79 In January 1999,
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan issued a call at the World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland for leaders to "initiate a global compact of
shared values and principles, which will give a human face to the global
market."80 The resulting U.N. Global Compact became the world's
largest corporate citizenship initiative, focusing on ten principles related
76 Id. at 68. In the United States, the national contact point is within the Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs. OECD, OECD Guidelines for MultinationalEnterprises:
National Contact Points, at 4 (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/
daflinternationalinvestment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/2012NCPContactDetail
s.pdf.
7
See EUROPEAN CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL & HUMAN RIGHTS, A COMPARISON OF
NATIONAL CONTACT PoINTS--BEST PRACTICES IN OECD COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES 3,
9-10 (2011), available at http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/ecchr-publications/articles/acomparison-of-national-contact-points-best-practices-in-oecd-complaints-procedures- 1333.
html (discussing different procedures at different National Contact Points); de Brabandere,
supra note 23, at 275-76.
78 E.S.C. Res. 1721 (LIII),
1, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc.
E/5209, at 3-4 (July 28, 1972).
7
See Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities Res.
1998/8, Rep. on its 50th Sess., Aug. 2-28, 1998, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/4E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/45, at 31-32 (Sept. 30, 1998).
80 See Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global
Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic Forum in
Davos, U.N. Press Release SGISM/6881 (Feb. 1, 1999).
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to human rights, labor, the environment, and anticorruption. 81 The
Global Compact has over 10,000 signatories from 145 countries around
the world. 82
But like the "greenwashing" initiatives in the environmental
arena,83 many companies signed on to U.N. compacts and engaged in
"bluewashing" to appear as though they had official intergovernmental
approval for their CSR programs, including those relating to labor and
human rights. 84 In fact, the Global Compact's own Executive Director
has publicly acknowledged that only fifteen percent of the Global 100085
companies participating in the program are likely "sincere" or "seriousj"
about sustainability. 86 Further, critics complain that the core
requirements are not stringent enough and that there are no
independent monitoring requirements.87
81 See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, 1 217, U.N. Doc. A/61/1 (Aug. 16, 2006); United Nations Global Compact,
After the Signature: A Guide to Engagement in the United Nations Global Compact 13-14,
16-17
(Jan. 2012), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news events/8. 1/after the_
signature.pdf.
82
United Nations Global Compact, Annual Review of Business Policies & Actions
to Advance Sustainability: 2011 Global Compact Implementation Survey 3 (2012),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/newsevents/8.1/2011_GlobalCompactImplementat
ionSurvey.pdf.
83 Greenwashing refers to environmental claims made by companies that are false
or misleading. RINA HORIUCHI ET AL., BSR & FUTERRA, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING
GREENWASH: A BUSINESS GUIDE 6 (2009), available at http://www.bsr.org/reports/
UnderstandingPreventingGreenwash.pdf. The Federal Trade Commission has issued
guidelines to help marketers avoid misleading claims. Guides for the Use of Environmental
Marketing Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,122, 62,124 (Oct. 11, 2012) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R.
pt. 260).
84 See Daniel Berliner & Aseem Prakash, From Norms to Programs: The United
Nations Global Compact and Global Governance, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 149, 162 (2012)
("[Violuntary programs which do not impose real obligations on firms or do not back them
with sufficient monitoring-'bluewashes' or 'Astroturfs'-have a greater chance of
failure."). For an early use of the term "bluewashing," see KENNY BRUNO & JOSHUA
KARLINER, TRANSNATIONAL RES. & ACTION CTR., TANGLED UP IN BLUE: CORPORATE
PARTNERSHIPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS 7 (2000), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/
corpwatch.org/downloads/tangled.pdf (discussing how corporations may participate in the
Global Compact in order to appear socially responsible).
85 These are the top 1000 performing companies in the world. Consider, for
example, Russell Investment's "Global 1000 Index." RUSSELL INVS., RUSSELL GLOBAL
INDEXES:
CONSTRUCTION
AND
METHODOLOGY
52-53
(2012),
available at
http://www.russell.comlindexes/documents/GlobalIndexesMethodology.pdf.
86 See Only Fifteen Percent of Multinationals Serious About Sustainability, CORP.
CRIME REP., Apr. 23, 2012, at 3, 3.
87 See Daniel Berliner & Aseem Prakash, Good Norm, Weak Program: CrossNational Diffusion of the United Nations Global Compact 36 (Sept. 2-5, 2010) (paper
prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Washington, D.C.), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
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In light of the criticism of the nonbinding nature of the Global
Compact, it is not surprising the U.N. tried to legally bind corporations
for human rights violations in 2004; however, the U.N. was
unsuccessful.8 8 The U.N. Draft Norms attempted to legislate against
corporate human rights abuses at the supranational level, so as to apply
regardless of where TNCs operated.8 9 The Draft Norms would have
established positive duties to promote human rights and to assess
human rights impacts, and would have forbade corporations from
directly or indirectly contributing to or benefitting from human rights
abuses or otherwise undermining efforts to promote human rights.9 0 The
NGOs, which had criticized the voluntary initiatives, applauded these
efforts.91 Not only did corporations object, 92 but even the United States
itself objected, asserting that states-not corporations-are the
traditional subjects of international law.93 Others suggested that the
Norms as drafted were vague and unenforceable.9 4
papers.cfm?abstractid=1642076 (observing that some believe the Compact represents
"excessive compromise" and requires "only marginal 'beyond compliance' requirements on
firms").
88 KENAN INST. FOR ETHICS, DuKE UNIV., THE U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION 4-5 (2012),
available
at
http://kenan.ethics.duke.edulwp-content/uploads/2012/07/UN-GuidingPrinciples-on-Business-and-Human-Rights-Analysis-and-Implementation.pdf.
89 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, SubComm'n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2
(Aug. 26, 2003) ("Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational
corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the
fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in
international as well as national law, including the rights and interests of indigenous
people and other vulnerable groups.").
9o See id.; ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion &
Prot. of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary on the Norms
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, T 1 cmt. b, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (Aug. 26,
2003).
91 See Isabella D. Bunn, Global Advocacy for Corporate Accountability:
TransatlanticPerspectives from the NGO Community, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1265, 127071, 1285 (2004).
92 See ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion & Prot.
of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Joint Written Statement
Submitted by the International Chamber of Commerce and the International Organization
of Employers, Non-Governmental Organizations in General Consultative Status, at 3, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/NG0/44 (July 29, 2003) (stating that voluntary corporate action is
superior to regulation as a means of achieving social progress).
9
See United States Mission to International Organizations, Response from the
Gov't of the U.S. to Dzidek Kedzia, Chief of Research and Right to Dev. Branch, Office of
the United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights, Note Verbale from the OHCHR of
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In 2005, the U.N. appointed John Ruggie as its Special
Representative on the Issue of Human Rights, Transnational
Corporations, and Other Business Enterprises.95 In that capacity, Ruggie
issued two critical reports that have shaped the way in which TNCs view
their obligations overseas. In 2008, Ruggie issued his "Protect, Respect
and Remedy" framework in which he posited that (1) the state has a
"duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties" or nonstate actors, including business entities; (2) the corporation has a
"responsibility to respect human rights," including conducting due
diligence, impact assessments, and auditing processes; and (3) there is a
"need for more effective access to remedies" beyond the "patchwork" of
flawed mechanisms. 96 In 2011, Ruggie responded to calls to
"operationalize" his recommendations and issued the Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
"Protect,Respect and Remedy" Framework ("Ruggie Guidelines"), which
provided principles that were again voluntary and nonbinding,9 7 but
which were actually praised by the business and intergovernmental
community, including the OECD, which ultimately adopted the U.N.'s
recommendations. 98 Again, his efforts were criticized by some for not
going far enough and for their nonbinding nature.99
available at
at 2-3
(Sept. 30,
2004),
August 3,
2004 (GVA
2537),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/business/docs/us.pdf ("This exercise...
circumvents all recognized law making processes by attempting to impose international
obligations on entities that have neither accepted them nor played a part in their
creation."); see also Carlos M. Vdzquez, Direct us. Indirect Obligations of Corporations
Under InternationalLaw, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 929 (2005) (observing that the
U.S. Council for International Business believed "that the Norms would 'represent a
fundamental shift in responsibility for protecting human rights-from governments to
ffectively privatizing the enforcement of human
private actors, including companies
rights laws"').
9
See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Promotionand Protection of
Human Rights: Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-Generalon the
Issue of Human Rights and TransnationalCorporations and Other Business Enterprises,
11 59, 66-67, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) (by John Ruggie).
9
See Press Release, Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie of United States
Special Representative on Issue of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, Other
Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. SG/A/934 (July 28, 2005).
96 See Ruggie Report, supra note 55, f 9, 17, 25, 61, 63, 87.
97 Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principleson Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy"
9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie)
Framework, intro.
[hereinafter Ruggie Guidelines].
9
See Jena Martin Amerson, "The End of the Beginning?"-A Comprehensive Look at
the U.N.'s Business and Human Rights Agenda from a Bystander Perspective, 17 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 871, 874-75 (2012). In 2011, the OECD updated its own Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, adding a chapter on human rights consistent with the Ruggie
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Both the Ruggie and OECD 2011 Guidelines stressed the
importance of TNCs conducting due diligence, monitoring, auditing, and
exerting pressure on their supply chains to prevent labor and human
rights abuses.100 These guidelines also foreshadowed key elements of
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act.101
But despite these attempts, one study indicates that while 28% of
2,508 companies surveyed apply a human rights policy to their supply
chains and 21% have plans to implement their policies, only 6% claim to
monitor their supply chains for compliance and only 7% have
enforcement mechanisms.102 Further, TNCs often do not have as much
leverage with their suppliers as one would think. Companies often lack
bargaining power in their own supply chain because the supplier is
under pressure from the TNC to keep costs low and may be operating in
a host country with lax laws. Suppliers can often find another buyer with
less onerous requirements that is not concerned about good business
practices or audits. Switching suppliers is also very costly and timeconsuming for the TNC and could impact local employees and, by
extension, the local economy.103
In summary, corporations balance their various interests, including
their public images and shareholder value. Prior to the passage of the
Dodd-Frank Act, they were able to make the decisions that seemed
sensible to them. Those that source minerals from the Congo or
adjoining countries are now faced with additional choices as the DoddFrank Act adds new complications.

Guidelines. See OECD, Guidelines, supra note 74, at 3-4; see also Lene Wendland, Advisor
on Bus. & Human Rights, Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Statement at
the OECD Roundtable on Corporate Responsibility 2 (June 29, 2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daflinternationalinvestment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/48
365284.pdf.
99 See Amerson, supra note 98, at 877 (suggesting that although the Guidelines are
weak, they are better than nothing at all).
100 See Ruggie Guidelines, supra note 97, at Annex 1 4, 5 & cmt., 20 & cmt.; OECD,
Guidelines, supranote 74, at 20, 22, 31, 33.
101 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing the supply-chain
monitoring that the Act and regulations require).
102 See Aaron Bernstein & Christopher Greenwald, Benchmarking Corporate
Policies on Labor and Human Rights in Global Supply Chains 11, 14 (Pensions & Capital
Stewardship Project Labor & Worklife Program, Harvard Law Sch., Occasional Papers No.
5, 2009), available at http://www.law.harvard.edulprograms/lwp/pensions/publications/
occpapers/occasionalpapers5.pdf.
103 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2012
Overview: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies 21-22 (July 2012),
http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Overview-en.pdf.
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THE HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS IN THE CONGO-IS THE CONFLICT OVER
MINERALS?

A. Background
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has become

mainly about access, control and trade of five key mineral resources:
coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt and gold. The wealth of the country is
appealing and hard to resist in the context of lawlessness and the
weakness of the central authority.104
The DRC lies in central Africa and is the size of Western Europe.
The country's "resource curse" is nothing new and is not unique. 0 5
Under this theory, resource-rich countries tend to be poorer than
countries without natural abundance due to shortsightedness of
policymakers, instability of international commodity markets, the
dominance of foreign multinationals in resource extraction, poor linkages
between the resource and non-resource sectors of the economy, "Dutch
Disease" (the hardship associated with exports), and/or the state's
inability to enforce property rights.106
The country has vast mineral riches including oil, rubber, gold,
copper, uranium, diamonds, cassiterite, wolframite, tantalum, and
cobalt.0 7 Despite its natural resources, the DRC ranked as the poorest
country in the world in 2008, 2009, and 2010.108 Additionally,
notwithstanding a gross domestic product ("GDP") of $15.66 billion
(USD) in 2011, its per capita GDP was only $216 (USD).1os In fact, only
Somalia ranks worse than the DRC on the 2012 Failed State Index,
which compares 177 states by considering twelve primary social,
104 U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Apr. 12, 2001 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, 213, U.N. Doc S/2001/357 (Apr. 12,
2001).
105 The term was popularized by Richard Auty. See RICHARD M. AUTY, SUSTAINING
DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES: THE RESOURCE CURSE THESIS 1 (1993).
106 See Michael L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 51 WORLD
POL. 297, 298 (1999) (summarizing various economic and political theories of the resource
curse).
107 Laura E. Seay, What's Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian
Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy, at text accompanying
n.3 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 284, 2012), available at http://www.cgdev.
org/content/publications/detail/1425843/.
10 The Poorest Countries in the World, GLOBAL FIN., http://www.gfmag.com/tools/
global-database/economic-data/12147-the-poorest-countries-in-the-world.html#axzz2NGd4
6kog (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
1o9 Report for Selected Countries and Subjects, INT'L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=78&pr.y-9&s
y-2011&ey-2011&ssm=1&ssd=1&sort-country&ds=.&br-1&c=636&s=NGDPD%2CNGD
PDPC&grp=0&a= (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
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economic, and political indicators." 0 The DRC ranks 155th out of 167
countries in the 2010 Democracy Index"' and lies at the bottom of the
2011 U.N. Human Development Index.112
The DRC is not only a failed state. It has been called a "predatory"
structure in which the government abuses the citizenry "to maintain
power and control[ the resources of the state for the benefit of a few"
rather than for the benefit of the citizens collectively."13 But this is not a
recent phenomenon. Over one hundred years ago, Belgium's King
Leopold II annexed the Congo Free State, as he called it, as his own
personal fiefdom."1 From 1880 to 1920 during King Leopold's reign and
its immediate aftermath, an estimated 10 million Africans died after
having been beaten to death, having their hands chopped off for failing
to meet quotas, starving, or succumbing to disease as Leopold earned
today's equivalent of $1 billion (USD) trading in ivory, rubber, and other
resources mined through slave labor.115 Belgium maintained control of
the colony until 1960.116
Since achieving independence from Belgium in 1960, a series of
corrupt leaders have ruled the country. Despite the moniker of a
"democratic" republic, observers note that the government is
dysfunctional; there is a lack of rule of law; corruption runs rampant
through all branches of government; and the country has a poor human
rights record, particularly related to gender-based and sexual violence.117
110 NATE HAKEN ET AL., THE FUND FOR PEACE, FAILED STATES INDEX 2012, at
3-4
(2012),
available
at
http://www.fundforpeace.org/globalllibrary/cfsirl210failedstatesindex2012-06p.pdf. "Failed states" are those generally unable or unwilling to
provide their citizens with the basic functions typically associated with government, such
as protection, basic public services, and essential infrastructure. Id. at 12. The Failed State
Index assesses 177 countries. Id. at 3.
111 THE ECONOMIST, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2010: DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT 7 (2010),

available at http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/DemocracyIndex 2010_web.pdf.
112 U.N.D.P., Human Development Report 2011: Sustainability and Equity: A Better
Future for All, at 134 (2011), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_EN
Contents.pdf.
113 ARVIND GANESAN & ALEX VINES, Engine of War: Resources, Greed, and the
Predatory State, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2004: HUMAN RIGHTS AND

ARMED CONFLICT 301, 305 (2004) (discussing the creation of predatory governments in
resource-rich countries).
114 ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND

HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 87 (1998).
115 Id. at 225-27, 230, 233, 277, 301.
116 Id. at 301.

117 See BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, BTI 2012: CONGO, DR COUNTRY REPORT 4, 11, 17
(2012), available at http://www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdflBTI%
202012%2OCongo%20DR.pdf (evaluating 128 developing countries); ABI DYMOND, THE
SCO'lISH CATHOLIC INT'L AID FUND, ENDING MASS RAPE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 6, available at http://
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In 2011, the country held only its second multiparty election-a process
tainted by allegations of illegitimacy from around the world-in which
President Joseph Kabila was re-elected.11s
One of the difficulties facing the DRC government in maintaining
order is that the capital, Kinshasa, is 1600 kilometers away from one of
the most important cities, Goma, in the eastern part of the country,
which has been ravaged by war since the 1990s. The government has
never had complete control over the eastern part of the country,
particularly the Kivu region, where Goma is located, due to distance and
occupation from various armed groups.119 Since 1998, as a result of wars
(at one time involving up to eleven neighboring nations), millions of
people have been displaced, and over 5 million people have died from
malnutrition, disease, and violence, making it the deadliest conflict since
World War 11.120 Although the war officially ended in 2003, the U.N.'s
peacekeeping presence in the DRC is one of the largest in the world with
over 19,000 uniformed personnel as of January 2013.121 The force has

www.congoweek.org/pdfending-mass-rape.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE WAR WITHIN
THE WAR: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS IN EASTERN CONGO 8 n.3 (2002)
[hereinafter
THE
WAR
WITHIN
THE
WAR],
available
at
http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2002/drc/CongoO6O2.pdf (defining the difference between genderbased and sexual violence as human rights abuses in the DRC).
118 See, e.g., Adam Nossiter, President of Congo Denies Reports of Election Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at Al5 (noting widespread criticism of the presidential results);
Chaotic Congo Vote Count Mars Credibility of Result: EU Says Congo Results Lack
Transparency, REUTERS,
Dec.
13, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/12/13/congo-democratic-election-idUSL6E7ND6472011
1213;
DR Congo
Election: Joseph Kabila 'Re-elected'- President Joseph Kabila Has Won the Democratic
Republic of Congo's Election, Provisional Results Show, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2011),
http:www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16114824 (noting general international protests
and, specifically, European Union observer mission reports that the polls contained
"numerous irregularities, sometimes serious").
119 See DYMOND, supra note 117, at 3, 6.
120 JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS: THE COLLAPSE OF THE
CONGO AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA 4-5 (2011); Simon Robinson, The Deadliest War in
the World, TIME, June 5, 2006, at 38, 39. For comprehensive descriptions of the history of
the Congo and the Congolese wars, see generally S9VERINE AUTESSERRE, THE TROUBLE
WITH THE CONGO: LOCAL VIOLENCE AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING
(Christian Reus-Smit & Nicholas J. Wheeler eds., 2010); PETER EICHSTAEDT, CONSUMING
THE CONGO: WAR AND CONFLICT MINERALS IN THE WORLD'S DEADLIEST PLACE (2011);

HOCHSCHILD, supra note 114.
121 See Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, supra note 34.
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officially extended its mission until June 2013.122 As of the end of June
2012, over 2.2 million people remain displaced in the DRC.123
Notwithstanding the significant number of peacekeepers and the
spotlight of the world, local and international rebel groups have
continued to attack military and civilians alike, causing the DRC to
remain in a state of war. These armed groups include the National
Congress for the Defense of the People ("CNDP");124 the Lord's
Resistance Army ("LRA");125 the Hutu rebels involved in the Rwandan
genocide known as the Forces D6mocratiques de Liberation du
Rwanda ("FDLR");126 the citizen militia Mai-Mai;127 the M23, purportedly
backed by the Rwandan government (which denies involvement);128 and
other groups.129 Armed groups fight for a number of reasons including
122 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Extends Mandate of UN
Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo Until 30 June 2013, Unanimously Adopting
Resolution 2053 (2012), U.N. Press Release SC/10687 (June 27, 2012).
123 UNICEF, UNICEF Humanitarian Action Update: Democratic Republic of the
Congo, at 2 (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.unicef.org/hac2012/files/UNICEFDRC
Humanitarian ActionUpdate 2012.pdf.
124 Chair of the Security Council Committee Concerning the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Letter dated Nov. 29, 2011 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee
Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the President of the Security Council,
1 36, U.N. Doc. S/2011/738 (Nov. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Nov. 29, 2011 Letter].
125 Id.
1 66-68.
126 Id. 1 69; Int'l Refugee Rights Initiative & Soc. Sci. Research Council, Who
Belongs Where? Conflict, Displacement, Land and Identity in North Kivu, Democratic
Republic of Congo (Open Soc'y Inst., Working Paper No. 3, 2010), available
at http://www.refugee-rights.org/Publications/Papers/2010/Who%2OBelongs%20Where.EN.
March2010.pdf.
127 Nov. 29, 2011 Letter, supra note 124, 11 160-61.
128 See Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Letter dated Nov. 26, 2012
from the Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the DRC to the Chairman of the Security
Council Committee Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc
S/AC.43/2012/COMM.64 (Nov. 27, 2012) (stating publicly that the Rwandan government,
with assistance from the government of Uganda, has backed and financed the M23 rebel
forces, which captured the key city of Goma in the eastern part of Congo on November 20,
2012); Press Release, Security Council, Sanctions Committee Concerning Democratic
Republic of Congo Adds Two Individuals, Two Entities to Sanctions List, U.N. Press
Release SC/10876 (Dec. 31, 2012) (adding M23 to the U.N. official Sanctions List on
December 31, 2012, stating that the group "has been complicit in and responsible for
committing serious violations of international law involving the targeting of women and
children in situations of armed conflict in the DRC including killing and maiming, sexual
violence, abduction, and forced displacement"). In February 2013, eleven African leaders
signed a U.N.-backed peace agreement aimed at stabilizing Eastern Congo, reforming the
Congolese state, and ending regional interference. See DR Congo: African Leaders Sign
Peace Deal, BBC (February 24, 2013, 5:57 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa21563949. The peace deal did not address the armed groups, however, and the fighting
between rebel forces persisted.
129 Nov. 29, 2011 Letter, supra note 124,
41, 219, 238.
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disputes over land, identity (who is Congolese and who is not), and
citizenship rights.130 The international community has focused on the
fight for access to the vast mineral resources as the primary cause of the
violence, although not all commentators agree.13 1
B. The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War
Margot Wallstrim, the U.N.'s Special Representative on Sexual
Violence in Conflict, has branded the DRC as the "rape capital of the
world."132 In fact, the scale of sexual violence in the DRC qualifies the
actions as crimes against humanity under Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.' 3 3
There are a number of reasons that perpetrators in the DRC engage
in gender-based and sexual violence, and a comprehensive analysis is
beyond the scope of this Article. Because, however, the NGO community
and key legislators tied the fight over conflict minerals to the
pervasiveness of rape (as this Article discusses in Part III), it is
important to discuss the scope of the problem in some detail.
Because Congolese society values virginity, marriage, and
childbearing, sexual violence weakens and destroys community bonds
and leaves the community in constant fear. 134 Perpetrators often gangrape women and girls, use crude objects to penetrate them in full view of
their family members, or force family members to participate in the rape
in an effort to dehumanize the family as well as the survivors. " Rapists
beat, stab, or mutilate women and children, and an estimated 22% of
rape survivors contract HIV.136 In many instances, rape of the local
130

See Int'l Refugee Rights Initiative & Soc. Sci. Research Council, supra note 126,

at 5, 17.
131 Seay, supra note 107, at text accompanying n.1 ("In the United States, the issue
of conflict minerals has become one of the dominant narratives about the crisis.").
132 U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security: Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral,at 4, U.N. Doc. S[PV.6302 (Apr. 27, 2010).
133 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(1)(g), opened for
signatureJuly 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
134 See Marleen Bosmans, Challenges in Aid to Rape Victims: The Case of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 4 ESSEX HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 4-6 (2007) (discussing the
fact that "child victims of rape ... los[e] whatever possibilities for marriage they may
have"); DYMOND, supra note 117, at 5 ("The deeply intimate nature of the violence ...
weakens and destroys community bonds. Sexual violence provokes tension within and
between communities and leaves behind long lasting fear and suspicion.").
135 GaIlle Breton-Le Goff, Ending Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 34 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 13, 16-17 (2010).
136 Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences,
Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and
Cultural, Including the Right to Development: Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Addendum: Mission to the Democratic
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women provides a means of creating more children belonging to the
perpetrators' ethnic group, thus altering the region's national, ethnic,
and religious identities.'37 Systematic rape also serves as a form of ethnic
cleansing by driving people from their homes and villages. 138
Some rapists kidnap women on the way to the market or the forests
where they gather wood to serve as sex slaves and laborers often for days
or even months.' 39 Many survivors avoid returning to their farms or the
markets to avoid future rapes, 140 which compounds family and
community poverty given the fact that women's economic activity has a
substantial effect on the overall economic development of the
community.141 The average age of rape survivors is dropping, and rapes
of girls aged eight to thirteen are extremely common. 142
It is difficult to obtain accurate and definitive data on sexual
violence in part because many survivors are afraid to report rape due to
stigma and the nonfunctioning Congolese justice system.143 Further,
Republic of the Congo, 1 55-56, 58, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/7/6/Add.4
(Feb. 28, 2008) (by Yakin Ertiirk).
137 M. Melandri, Gender and Reconciliationin Post-Conflict Societies: The Dilemmas
of Responding to Large-Scale Sexual Violence, 5 INT'L PUB. POL'Y. REV. 4, 9-10 (2009),
availableat http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/journal/downloads/vol5-lfM-Melandri.pdf.
138 Id. at 10.
139 See, e.g., Ahuka Ona Longombe et al., Fistulaand Traumatic Genital Injury from
Sexual Violence in a Conflict Setting in Eastern Congo: Case Studies, 16 REPROD. HEALTH
MATTERS 132, 132 (2008).
140 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOLDIERS WHO RAPE, COMMANDERS WHO CONDONE:
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND MILITARY REFORM IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 30
(2009) [hereinafter SOLDIERS WHO RAPE, COMMANDERS WHO CONDONE], available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/defaultfiles/reports/drc0709web.pdf;
Coco McCabe, In Congo,
Women Face Sexual Violence and Its Legacy of Shame and Hardship, OXFAM INT'L (July
2008),
http://www.oxfam.org/en/development/congo-women-face-sexual-violence-and-itslegacy-shame-and-hardship; see also, e.g., Mark Tran, "It Was Like Dying'- A Raped
Woman in Congo DRC Speaks Out, GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
global-development/2013/feb/14/dying-raped-woman-congo-drc.
141 MARGOT WALLSTROM, ADDRESSING CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE: AN
ANALYTICAL INVENTORY OF PEACEKEEPING PRACTICE 23 (2010) (noting that women's
economic activity can have "a powerful multiplier effect for recovery and development"); D.
E. Tempelman, Rural Women and Food Security: Current Situation and Perspectives, FAO
CORP. DOCUMENT REPOSITORY, tbl.1 (1998), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/0031
W8376E/w8376e03.htm.
142 Michael Maya, Reflections on ABA ROL's Efforts to Combat the
Rape Crisis in
War-Torn Eastern Congo, AM. BAR AsS'N (June 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/
advocacy/rule of law/where we work/africa/democratic republicscongo/news/news drc ref
lections aba roli efforts to combat the rapecrisis_0611.html.
143 Helen Liebling et al., Women and Girls Bearing Children Through Rape in Goma,
Eastern Congo: Stigma, Health and Justice Responses, 4 ITUPALE ONLINE J. AFR. STUD. 18,
19 (2012), available at http://www.cambridgetoafrica.org/resources/LieblingSlegh
andRuratotoyeItupale_2012.pdf.
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while there is no one source that compiles these statistics, according to
the U.N. Population Fund, "an estimated 200,000 women and girls have
been assaulted over the past 12 years, with more than 18,000 cases
reported between January and February 2008 alone."144 South Kivu
alone recorded 45 rapes per day in 2008.145 In the Shabunda region,
researchers estimate that 70% of the females have been raped. 146 In
2011, a study estimated that between 1.69 to 1.80 million Congolese
women aged fifteen to forty-nine had experienced rape in their
lifetime.147 Given the state of women's rights in the DRC and the fact
that so many women have been displaced, have migrated, or have died
since the conflict began, the number may be much higher than reported.
C. Government, U.N., and Civilian Involvement in Sexual and Gender-

Based Violence
Despite Congo's riches, the central government does a poor job of
compensating its employees. Police officers, judges, and members of the
military sometimes work for months without receiving salaries.148
Members of the military and the police often prey upon the citizens they
are sworn to protect, while judges often accept bribes to compensate for
the lack of salary. 149 Police officers and prison wardens often rape or
prostitute women with impunity.150 While militias, particularly the
FDLR, commit a large number of the reported rapes, many rapists come
from the Congolese military ("FARDC") or from the police force. The
U.N. estimated in 2007 that the FARDC and the Congolese National
Police Force committed 20% of the sexual violence.151 Many members of
the military do not have barracks and sleep outside or raid civilian
homes for shelter, and they may commit rape as a crime of
144 Secretary-General Calls Attention to Scourge of Sexual Violence in DRC, UNFPA
(Mar. 1, 2009), http://www.unfpa.org/public[News/pid/2181.
145 DYMOND, supra note 117, at 3.
146 Id. at 4.

147 AMBER PETERMAN ET AL., IF NUMBERS COULD SCREAM: ESTIMATES AND
DETERMINANTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 1 (2011),

available at
http://www.stonybrookmedicalcenter.org/system/files/INCSCongoBrief_
r6%20%281%29.pdf.
148 See SOLDIERS WHO RAPE, COMMANDERS WHO CONDONE, supra note 140, at 44.
149 See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2011: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE
CONGO 8-11 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186395.pdf.

See Breton-Le Goff, supra note 135, at 19.
See Press Release, U.N. Expert on Violence Against Women Expresses Serious
Concerns Following Visit to Democratic Republic of Congo (July 30, 2007),
http://www.unhchr.chlhuricane/huricane.nsfl0/B5D0053875B01B8CC1257328003A8FEE?
opendocument [hereinafter Press Release, July 30, 2007].
150
151
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opportunity.152 Others commit rapes to penalize those they believe
support rebel groups.153
In 2008, in the provinces of North and South Kivu, the U.N.
registered 7703 cases of soldiers and others committing sexual violence,
but judges convicted only twenty-seven soldiers of crimes of sexual
violence.154 In October 2010, the U.S. Department of State estimated
that members of armed groups, the police, and the Congolese military
were responsible for 81% of all reported cases of sexual violence in the
conflict zones and almost a quarter of the rapes in non-conflict zones.155
The U.N. itself does not have clean hands-U.N. peacekeepers have
reportedly sexually exploited the Congolese through "survival" and
"transactional" sex.156 Further, survivors have accused civilians,
members of the clergy, and teachers of rape.15 7 According to one
estimate, 30% of the perpetrators of child rape were civilians.158 In some
cities such as Shabunda and Fizi, a study found that civilians committed
approximately 70% of the reported sexual violence. 15 9 Further,
researchers report civilians joining in with the military on "rape
raids."160 Some believe that the reintegration of armed forces into the
civilian population with impunity for past crimes, coupled with the
complete lack of rule of law and normalization of rape, has led to the
increase in civilian criminality. 161
152 See SOIDIERS WHO RAPE, COMMANDERS WHO CONDONE, supra note 140, at 44.
153 Press Release, July 30, 2007, supra note 151.
154 SOLDIERS WHO RAPE, COMMANDERS WHO CONDONE, supranote 140, at 6.

155 Congo (Kinshasa) (10/08/10), U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Oct. 8, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/congokinshasa/160840.htm.
156 CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS RESPONDS TO SEXUAL
ABUSE BY PEACEKEEPERS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (2005) (reporting
allegations that U.N. personnel used "survival sex" to exploit "Congolese girls as young as
11 years of age in exchange for small amounts of money and scraps of food"); UN Probing
Charges of Sex Abuse in DR of Congo, Peacekeeping Official Says, UNITED NATIONS NEWS
CENTRE (Nov. 23, 2004), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?Cr=democratic&Crl=
congo&NewslD=12623#.UT51NtFl8O8.
157 See DYMOND, supra note 117, at 6 (accusing civilians of rape); THE WAR WITHIN
THE WAR, supra note 117, at 21 (accusing teachers of rape).
158 Breton-Le Goff, supra note 135, at 16.
159 See DYMOND, supra note 117, at 7 (reporting a study that ran from
January to
March 2008).
160 Bosmans, supra note 134, at 7.
161 See OPEN SOC'Y INITIATIVE FOR S. AFR., HELPING TO COMBAT IMPUNITY FOR
SEXUAL CRIMES IN DRC: AN EVALUATION OF THE MOBILE GENDER JUSTICE COURTS 17
(2012)

(addressing

the

need

to

change

the

"normalization"

of rape

committed

predominately by civilians), available at http://www.osisa.orglsites/default/files/open
learning-drc-web.pdf- Breton-Le Goff, supra note 135, at 19, 29 (noting that the
reintegration of ex-militia members into the community and general corruption are
aggravating factors of the violence in the DRC). Congo does have laws protecting women.
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Combatants have used rape as a weapon of war throughout history,
including most recently in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and the
former Yugoslavia.162 The DRC is no different, although the scale is
reported to be unprecedented. The worldwide attention devoted to the
use of rape by militias, coupled with the militias' involvement in the
mineral trade, led to legislation in the United States to address the
problem.
D. The Conflict over Minerals
By some estimates, mining "accounts for 80% of the exports, 72% of
the national budget and 28% of [Congo's] GDP," and thus, for many
families, particularly in the eastern part of the country, it is the only
source of income. 63 But the amount of Congo's minerals as a percentage
of worldwide totals has been wildly overstated by supporters of conflict
mineral legislation. Although many claim that the Congo has 70 to 80%
of the world's supply of coltan, studies indicate that the number is closer
to 10%.164
But clearly, the country's riches have made its people vulnerable for
over a hundred years, and, today, rebels, warlords, and corrupt members
of the military extort "taxes" from the artisanal miners who dig the

In 2006, the DRC, along with other states in the region, passed the seminal Protocol on the
Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children, which
prohibits forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, genital mutilation, forced prostitution,
statutory rape, and forced sterilization. Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression of
Sexual Violence Against Women and Children, International Conference of the Great
Nov. 30, 2006, available at http://www.internalLakes Region, art. (1)(2)(g),
displacement.org/8025708FO04BE3B1/(httplnfoFiles)/381B8D820A51C229C12572FBO02C
OC5B/$file/Final%20protocol.Sexual%2OViolence%20-%2OEn.pdf.
162 See CASSANDRA CLIFFORD, RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR AND IT'S [SIC] LONG-TERM
EFFECTS ON VICTIMS AND SOCIETY (2008) (listing countries where rape has been used as a
weapon of war); WORLD HEALTH ORG., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND HIV/AIDS:
CRITICAL INTERSECTIONS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT SETTINGS AND THE RISK OF HIV

1, availableat http://www.who.int/gender/en/infobulletinconflict.pdf.
163 Aloys Tegera, Dir. of Research, Pole Inst., A Congolese Perspective on US
Conflict Minerals Legislation, Keynote Speech to Roundtable Hosted by Judith Sargentini,
Member of European Parliament (May 26, 2011), in ROUNDTABLE ON CONFLICT MINERALS
LEGISLATION: TOWARDS PREVENTION OF TRADE IN CONFLICT MINERALS AND PROMOTION OF
TRADE IN CLEAN MINERALS FROM CONGO 8, 8 (2011).
164 Compare The DevastatingCrisis in Eastern Congo: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Afr., Global Health, & Human Rights of the H. Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 112th Cong. 3
(2012) (statement of Rep. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa,
Global Health, and Human Rights, Committee on Foreign Affairs) (claiming that DRC has
70% of the world's coltan and 30% of the world's diamond reserves), with EICHSTAEDT,
supra note 120, at 140 (noting that the Congo only supplies about 10% of the world's
coltan).
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minerals by hand from the ground with their own tools.165 Rebels and
members of the military reportedly smuggle minerals through
neighboring countries.166 A U.N. group of observers has reported that
rebels in the Congo's neighboring countries have in fact backed rebel
forces.167 Rebels loot, pillage, rape, and murder innocent civilians for a
host of complex reasons, including for their minerals.168 Reportedly,
many civilians also fear the Congolese army as much as or more than
the rebels. 169

After decades of war involving international peacekeepers and
significant international aid, NGOs and the U.S. government finally
sought a legislative solution to the crisis in the Congo.
Nov. 29, 2011 Letter, supra note 124, at 113-14.
See id. (noting that smuggling through illegal border crossings is a common
problem in the DRC and that ex-CNDP commanders, the FARDC, and other officers and
members of the police continue to smuggle minerals across borders).
167 Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the DRC, supra note 128 ("[T]he Group
[of Experts] has repeatedly concluded that the Government of Rwanda (GoR), with the
support of allies within the Government of Uganda, has created, equipped, trained,
advised, reinforced and directly commanded the M23 rebellion.").
168 The standard narrative given for the reason behind the conflict minerals law is
that consumer demand for electronics drives corporations to source minerals from DRC,
which has mines controlled by rebels who use revenues from corporations to fund their
rebellions, often involving child soldiers, and who engage in raping, pillaging, and looting.
However, there are other possible hypotheses for M23's motives, including "historic
grievances, ethnic tensions, economic gain, and political control." INT'L PEACE INFO. SERV.,
165
166

MAPPING CONFLICT MOTIVES: M23, at 4 (2012) [hereinafter MAPPING CONFLICT MOTIVES].

The International Peace Information Service ("IPIS") compiles comprehensive research to
analyze the complex motives driving wars and conflicts. Mapping Conflict Motives in War
Areas, INT'L PEACE INFO. SERV., http://www.ipisresearch.be/mapping.php (last visited Mar.
8, 2013). In analyzing M23's motives, IPIS noted that although M23's initial push was to
implement an agreement between the CNDP and the Congolese government, M23 has
consistently moved in the direction of advocating for national political control. MAPPING
CONFLICT MOTIVES, supra, at 9-10. IPIS research revealed that control over minerals
seemed not to be a driving factor for M23 because, although many important mining sites
are within M23's reach, none of M23's recent operations have sought control over these
important mining sites. Id. at 14. M23 has political motivations both within the DRC and
without. Within, M23 has sought the support of other Congolese armed groups and
President Kabila's opposition. Id. at 16. Outside the DRC, M23 has received backing from
rebels in Rwanda and Uganda. Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the DRC, supra
note 128. In March 2013, a key leader of the head of M23, ex-Congolese army general Bosco
Ntaganda, turned himself in to the International Criminal Court, where he was sought for
war crimes. Bosco Ntaganda in the ICC: Profile of the Terminator, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 26,
2013, 10:15 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/
democraticrepublicofcongo/9953920/Bosco-Ntaganda-in-the-ICC-profile-of-the-Terminator.
html.
169 See, e.g., Gregory Warner, Congo Fighting Leaves a Fragile City on Edge, NPR,
Dec. 31, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/12/31/168345346/congo-fighting-leaves-a-fragilecity-on-edge (observing that while some people in a displaced persons camp fled the M23
rebel group, others fled the Congolese army).
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THE CONSTITUENCY OF CONSCIENCE: HOW THE "NAME-AND-SHAME"
LEGISLATION WAS BORN

A. Early Measures
American lawmakers have tried for years to stop the bloodshed in
the Congo. In 2005, then U.S. Senator Barack Obama introduced the
DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 ("DRC
Act"),o70 which was signed into law by President Bush.171 The legislation
established fifteen U.S. policy objectives addressing humanitarian needs,
social development, economic and natural resource management, and
governance and security sector reform concerns in the DRC.172 The DRC
Act highlighted the Congo's strategic importance as a large country that
had been destabilized by a number of wars and that was located in the
center of Africa surrounded by a number of other countries that were
either also unstable or could capitalize on DRC's instability. 7 3 The
American government was primarily focused on fighting terrorism,
which was closely linked to addressing the humanitarian crisis of
internally displaced persons, disease, war, and poverty. 74
Although the DRC Act did not use the term "conflict minerals,"
mindful of the connection between mineral riches and funding of rebel
forces, it did require the DRC's commitment to manage its natural
resources responsibly, "to hold accountable individuals who illegally
exploit the country's natural resources," and "to implement the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by enacting laws requiring
disclosure and independent auditing of company payments and
government receipts for natural resource extraction."17 5 As required by
the Act, approximately 70% of the hundreds of millions of dollars of U.S.
170 Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act
of 2005, S. 2125, 109th Cong. (2005). Hillary Clinton, during the time she was a senator,
also supported the bill and later joined as a co-sponsor of the Act. 152 CONG. REC. 9, 11,699
(2006).
171 Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-456, § 102, 120 Stat. 3384, 3385-87.
172 Id. (indicating that one of the policy objectives of "assisting the Government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo to establish a viable and professional national army
and police force that respects human rights and the rule of law, is under effective civilian
control, and possesses a viable presence throughout the entire country").
173 Id. at § 101(3)-(4).
174 Id. at § 101(1)-(2).
'75 Id. at § 102(8)(B)(ii)iii). The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is
globally developed and implemented by "a coalition of governments, companies, civil
society groups, investors and international organisations" and promotes transparency of
revenue payments for natural resources at the local level. What is the EITI?, EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/eiti (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
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funding in the fiscal years 2006 and 2007 went toward humanitarian
and social efforts, and 30% went toward economic and natural resource
management, governance, and security objectives.176 According to the
Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), which was tasked with
reviewing whether programs met the policy objectives, corruption, failed
governance, lack of basic infrastructure, and mismanagement of natural
resources hampered reform efforts. 7 7
The U.S. government, of course, was not alone in trying to resolve
issues in the Congo. NGOs around the world were also working to solve
the crisis in the Congo. Ironically, Congo has been called both the rape
and international humanitarian aid capital of the world. 78 For years,
organizations such as the Eastern Congo Initiative,79 Human Rights
Watch,180 Oxfam,sl Amnesty International,182 and Global Witness183
have highlighted the lack of government infrastructure, the need for
17 U.S. Gov'T AccOuNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-562T, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO: MAJOR CHALLENGES IMPEDE EFFORTS To ACHIEVE U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES;
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS Is NEEDED 7 (2008).
1'
Id. at 12.
178 Personal internet conversation on December 10, 2012, with Vava Tampa, founder
of Save the Congo, a U.K-based campaigning organization working to "raise awareness of,
and tackle the impunity, insecurity, institutional failure and [ililicit trade of minerals that
funds the wars in Congo." See SAVE THE CONGO, http://www.savethecongo.org.uk/ (last
visited Mar. 8, 2013).
19 About ECI, E. CONGO INITIATIVE, http://www.easterncongo.org/about (last visited
Mar. 8, 2013); What We Do, E. CONGO INITIATIVE, http://www.easterncongo.org/about/whatwe-do (last visited Mar. 8, 2013) (explaining that Eastern Congo Initiative funds local
Congolese organizations for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, funds peace and
reconciliation programs, promotes children's health, and also works to effect policy change
in Washington); see also The Democratic Republic of the Congo: SecuringPeace in the Midst
of Tragedy: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Afr., Global Health & Human Rights of the H.
Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 112th Cong. 50-54, 88-89 (2012) (noting that the founder of the
Eastern Congo Initiative, actor Ben Affleck, has testified before Congress on Congo).
180 About Us, HUM. RTs. WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/about (last visited Mar. 8,
2013); DR Congo: US Should Urge Rwanda to End M23 Support: Sanction Rwandan
Officials Backing Abusive
Congolese
Rebels,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(Nov.
8, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/20/dr-congo-us-should-urge-rwanda-end-m23support (reporting on its investigations into human rights abuses and its recent focus on
the M23 rebel group and calling on the United States to publicly support sanctions against
the Rwandan government).
181 Democratic Republic of Congo, OXFAM INT'L, http://www.oxfam.org/drc (last
visited Mar. 8, 2013) (focusing on short-term emergency relief and longer-term
development projects in Congo, particularly involving internally displaced persons).
182 Democratic Republic of Congo, AMNESTY INT'L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/ourwork/countries/africaldemocratic-republic-of-congo (last visited Mar. 8, 2013) (focusing on
human rights violations by the military and armed groups and promoting compliance with
mineral regulation legislation).
183 Our Work, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org (last visited Mar. 8,
2013) (focusing on natural-resources related to human rights issues).

384

REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:351

security sector reform, the health crisis, and the plight of the internally
displaced persons. The most vocal and successful advocate for the
conflict mineral legislation, Enough Project, was founded in 2007 to work
on issues related to Africa and, through its Raise Hope for Congo
campaign, has worked with activists around the world.184 The various
entities are well aware of the complexities of Congo's multilayered
problems and know that the blame does not lie solely with rebel forces.
As Oxfam pointed out, "government soldiers, armed rebels, police, and
civilian authorities are all vying for the right to exploit local
communities and extort money or goods from [citizens], pushing people
further into poverty and undermining their efforts to earn a living."185
Nonetheless, although earlier strategy papers focused on broader
issues similar to those raised in the DRC Act, from a CSR perspective,
Enough Project eventually realized that tying rape to electronics was a
simpler and more media-savvy method of focusing international media,
governments, corporations, and consumers on the complex and
intractable crisis in the Congo.
In April 2009, Enough Project released a report, declaring that [t]he
time has come to expose a sinister reality: Our insatiable demand for
electronics products such as cell phones and laptops is helping fuel
waves of sexual violence . . . . There are few other conflicts in the world

where the link between our consumer appetites and mass human
suffering is so direct.186
Enough Project developed and publicized a company ranking system
holding the twenty-four leading electronics companies publicly
accountable for their progress on ridding their products of conflict
minerals, spearheaded a conflict-free campus initiative, and advocated
184 See About Us, ENOUGH PROJECT, http://enoughproject.com/about (last visited
Mar. 8, 2013); see also About the Campaign, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO,
http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/contentlabout/about-the-campaign (last visited Mar. 8,
2013). John Prendergast, Enough Project's co-founder, testified on Congo-related matters
on Capitol Hill at the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa on March 8, 2011,
advocating for a special envoy to the Congo and reporting on the realized benefits in the
DRC since implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act. The DemocraticRepublic of the Congo:
Securing Peace in the Midst of Tragedy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Afr., Global
Health & Human Rights of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 79-88 (2011)
(statement of John Prendergast, Co-founder, Enough Project). Prendergast also testified
again before Congress on December 11, 2012. The Devastating Crisis in Eastern Congo:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Afr., Global Health & Human Rights of the H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 47-57 (2012) (statement of John Prendergast, Co-founder,
Enough Project).

OUT

185 STEVEN VAN DAMME, OXFAM INT'L, COMMODITIES OF WAR: COMMUNITIES SPEAK
TRUE COST OF CONFLICT IN EASTERN DRC 1 (2012), available at

ON THE

http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/commodities-war-drc.
186 JOHN PRENDERGAST, ENOUGH PROJECT, CAN You HEAR CONGO Now? CELL
PHONES, CONFLICT MINERALS, AND THE WORST SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE WORLD 1 (2009).
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for "conflict-free" cities.187 Companies that engaged with Enough Project
and its mission were favorably featured in its social media and other
campaigns. 188

Video campaigns by other activists went viral through social media,
including a British documentary entitled "Blood in the Mobile," which
encouraged interested viewers to contact Raise Hope for Congo and other
NGOs and encourage them to take action.189 Raise Hope for Congo
worked with socially responsible investors and companies to argue that
the only way to solve the crisis in the Congo was to change corporate and
consumer behavior and to stop the funding of rebel groups through the
purchase of conflict minerals.s 0 NGOs also pressured lawmakers in
Washington for legislative action to stop corporate complicity.' 9
Meanwhile, because the DRC Act did not focus solely on minerals,
some legislators in Congress also wanted freestanding conflict mineral
legislation, perhaps prodded by NGOs, but also based upon personal
experience in the region. Former Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas had
traveled to Congo with Senator Dick Durbin of Illinois in the past, and in
the same month as the Enough Project cell phone campaign, Brownback
introduced the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 ("Brownback Bill"),
co-sponsored by Senator Dick Durbin and Senator Russ Feingold of
Wisconsin.192 In his press release announcing the legislation, Brownback
explained,
Metals derived from inhumanely mined minerals go into electronic
products used by millions of Americans. In the Democratic Republic of
Congo, many people-especially women and children-are victimized
by armed groups who are trying to make a profit from mining 'conflict
minerals.' The legislation introduced today brings accountability and
transparency to the supply chain of minerals used in the
manufacturing of many electronic devices. I hope the legislation will
help save lives.' 93
187 Our Programs, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO, http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/
content/our-programs (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
188 See ENOUGH PROJECT, GETTING TO CONFLICT-FREE: ASSESSING CORPORATE
ACTION ON CONFLICT MINERALS 1-4 (2010) ('These rankings [of companies by their conflict
mineral engagement] are an effort to provide consumers with the information they need to
purchase responsibly, as well as a means of encouraging companies to continue to move
forward in good faith.").
189 See The Power Is in Your Pocket-Take Action, BLOOD MOBILE, http://bloodinthe
mobile.org/take-action (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
190 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 180, 184 and accompanying text.
192 Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. (2009).
193 Brownback, Durbin, Feingold Introduce Conflict Minerals Act: Press Release,
PROJECT VOTE SMART (Apr. 24, 2009), http://votesmart.org/public-statement/419962/
brownback-durbin-feingold-introduce-congo-conflict-minerals-act#.UOfaYInjlpk.
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This press release came only days after members of his campaign staff
participated in the "RAISE Your Voice Activist Conference Call," led by
field managers of Enough Project, to discuss upcoming conflict mineral
legislation. 194
The Brownback Bill began by discussing the prevalence of rape as a
weapon of war in Congo and the fact that the mismanagement of natural
resources has contributed to conflict among rebel forces and the
militias.195 The Brownback Bill also referred to U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1857,196 which encouraged member countries to ensure that
companies exercise due diligence when sourcing minerals from the
DRC.197 Among other things, the Brownback Bill directed the Secretary
of State to produce a Conflict Minerals Map, showing which mines were
under control of rebel forces, 198 and to
work with other member states of the United Nations and local and
international [NGOs] to provide guidance to commercial entities
seeking to exercise due diligence on their suppliers to ensure that the
raw materials used in their products do not(1) directly finance armed conflict;
(2) result in labor or human rights violations; or
(3) damage the environment.199
Notably, the Brownback Bill proposed amending Section 13 of the
Exchange Act 2 00 to require companies to disclose to the SEC "the country
of origin of columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, or wolframite" if the country
of origin is the DRC or an adjoining country or involves the funding of
the armed groups perpetuating the human rights violations described in
the Act. 201
Nonetheless, the Brownback Bill died 20 2 even though Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton clearly believed there was a connection between
194 Raise Your Voice Activist Conference Call, ENOUGH PROJECT (Apr. 15, 2009),
http://www.enoughproject.org/events/congo-challenge-advocacy-training-call.
195 S. 891, § 2(4)-(5).
196 S.C. Res. 1857,
15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1857 (Dec. 22, 2008) (renewing measures
on arms embargo against all nongovernmental entities and individuals operating in the
DRC).
197 S. 891, § 9.
198 This provision survived within Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, but the most
recent State Department map is from May 2012 as of March 2013. HUMANITARIAN INFO.
UNIT, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO MINERAL EXPLOITATION
BY ARMED GROUPS & OTHER ENTITIES (2012), available at https://hiu.state.gov/
Products/DRCConflict Minerals_2012May23 HIUU540.pdf.
199 S. 891, § 4(b)-(c).
200 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. V 2011).
201 S. 891, § 5.
202 See Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, GovTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/111/s891 (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
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minerals and human rights abuses. In August 2009, Secretary Clinton
visited the DRC and explicitly linked conflict minerals to rape when she
noted that the conflict in the DRC was over illegal mining of minerals
and then declared, "Women are being turned into weapons of war."203
Meanwhile, members of the U.S. House of Representatives also
wanted a freestanding bill focused solely on conflict minerals.
Representative Jim McDermott of Washington had served as a medical
officer in the Foreign Service in central Africa in the 1980s and then in
2007, and he was astounded by the human rights abuse when he visited
the Congo and talked with rape victims. 204 In November 2009, he
introduced the Conflict Minerals Trade Act (the "McDermott Bill"). 205
The McDermott Bill, among other things, was strikingly similar to the
Brownback Bill but would have prohibited the import of certain articles
and would have imposed penalties under Section 592 of the Tariff Act of
1930.206 There were no SEC disclosure requirements under the
McDermott Bill. Enough Project, through its parent organization, Center
for American Progress, supported the McDermott Bill, as did Human
Rights Watch, other NGOs, and the Information Technology Industry
Council. 207 This bill also failed to pass. 208
Despite the setbacks, these resolute lawmakers finally found an
opportunity through a very unlikely vehicle to achieve what had been so
elusive. Representative Jim McDermott summed up their philosophy by
saying, "You get bills passed any way you can."209
B. The Dodd-FrankAct and CorporateDisclosures
The financial crisis of 2008 became the unlikely vehicle for
Brownback, McDermott, and the NGO community to achieve their
respective ends. In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act. 210 The

203 Jeffrey Gettleman, Clinton Presses Congo on Minerals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
2009, at A7.
204 See Ben Protess, Dodd-FrankStrays Far from Street, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2011,
at BI.
205 Conflict Minerals Trade Act, H.R. 4128, 111th Cong. (2009).
206 Id. § 9(a); see also Tariff Act of 1930 § 592, 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (2006 & Supp. V
2012).
207 Seay, supra note 107.
208 See Conflict Minerals Trade Act, GovTRACK.Us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/1111hr4128 (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
209 Protess, supra note 204.
210 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The Act includes corporate governance and executive
compensation reforms, new rules for credit rating agencies, new registration requirements
for hedge fund and private equity fund advisers, heightened regulation of over-the-counter
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Dodd-Frank Act contained a number of sleeper provisions that most
investors did not notice. A conflict minerals provision was one of them,
inserted days before the Dodd-Frank Act was passed. 211 Another related
provision was Section 1504, the resource-extraction provision, which was
also heavily promoted by the NGO community. 212 Known as "publish
what you pay," this provision requires affected companies to disclose to
the SEC all payments above $100,000 made to either the United States
or a foreign government for the extraction of oil and minerals. 213
In adding Section 1502 as a human rights provision to the financial
reform law, legislators explained that "[i]t is the sense of Congress that
the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict
characterized by extreme levels of violence . . . particularly sexual- and

gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian
situation therein."214 Congress, therefore, sought to "reduce funding for
the armed groups contributing to the conflict" and "put pressure on such
groups to end the conflict." 21 5 Essentially, Section 1502 requires the SEC
to promulgate rules forcing issuers to disclose pertinent facts regarding
the origin of minerals.216 Section 1502 adopted much of what Brownback
proposed but was not without controversy, and the Act took two years for
final passage.
When the SEC published its proposed rules, it received over 400
comment letters, and it held 130 meetings with interested investors,
business groups, NGOs, and members of the public. 2 17 Although the
derivatives and asset-backed securities, and significantly increased oversight and
regulation of banks and other financial institutions. Id.
211 Brownback attached Section 1502 as an amendment, which was adopted by the
Senate by voice vote. 156 CONG. REc. S3865-66 (daily ed. May 18, 2010).
212 See PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, COMMENTS ON SECTION 1504 OF THE DODD-FRANK
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1, 7 (Nov. 22, 2010), available
at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/specialized-disclosures/specializeddisclosures82.pdf (commenting, with the support of 600 organizations, that "Section 1504 of the Act
embodies a significant contribution to the development of a global standard that will build
upon the efforts elsewhere and help address some lingering gaps').
213 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); Disclosure of Payments by
Resource Extraction Issuer, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,365, 56,368 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R pts. 240, 249).
214 Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(a), 124 Stat. at 2213.
215 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,276 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
216 Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(b), 124 Stat. at 2213.
217 See Proposed Rule:
Conflict Minerals, SEC.
& EXCH.
COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010.shtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). Many of
the comment letters were form letters signed on behalf of thousands of "concerned
consumers." E.g., Letter from 13,660 Concerned Consumers to the U.S. Securities and
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business groups that objected to the law almost universally lauded the
goal of stemming the tide of violence in the Congo, 2 18 their concerns
generally focused on the perceived vagueness of the requirements and
the costs of compliance. 219
While lobbyists and NGOs argued about the law's details in
Washington, DRC President Joseph Kabila initiated a mining embargo
from September 2010 to March 2011, which devastated the artisanal
miners and the surrounding communities, even after the embargo was
lifted. 220 In fact, in the DRC, President Obama and the "Obama Law," as
the Dodd-Frank Act was called, took the blame for the plunging fortunes
of the miners. 221

Exchange Commission (Feb. 17, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-4010/s74010-305.pdf.
218 For example, one of the most vocal critics of the law and a petitioner in the
lawsuit, the National Association of Manufacturers ("NAM"), began its comment letter to
the SEC stating, "We support the underlying goal of Sec. 1502 to address the atrocities
occurring in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and adjoining countries and are
actively working with other stakeholders to help address the problem." Letter from
Stephen Jacobs, Senior Dir., Int'l Econ. Affairs, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., to Mary L. Schapiro,
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.nam.org/~/medial
DE6DA95D7CA5475BB24F80869A643CD3/NAM Comments on Conflict minerals_3 2_1
1_as submitted.pdf.
219 Many critics cite the report by Chris Bayer and Dr. Elke de Buhr. See generally
CHRIS BAYER & ELKE DE BUHR, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SEC AND NAM ECONOMIC
IMPACT MODELS AND THE PROPOSAL OF A 3RD MODEL IN VIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SECTION 1502 OF THE 2010 DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER

PROTECTION ACT 3 (2011), available at http:/Ilawprofessors.typepad.com/files/tulanestudy.pdf (concluding that the SEC's $71.2 million figure underestimated the cost of
implementation and did not "take into account the range of actors affected by the statutory
law," while NAM's figure of $9-16 billion overstated the costs and did not take efficiencies
into account, and estimating the true cost of compliance at closer to $7.93 billion for
affected companies and first-tier suppliers); Letter from Erik 0. Autor, Vice President, Int'l
Trade Counsel, Nat'l Retail Fed'n, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n
(Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s74010-386.pdf.
220 See David Aronson, How Congress Devastated Congo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011,
at A19 (arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act caused a de facto embargo on mineral mining
even before the final law had passed); Seay, supra note 107, at text accompanying n.24.
221 Editorial, Africa and 'Obama's Embargo,' WALL ST. J., July 18, 2011, at A12; see
also Laura Heaton, Congolese Living in Mining Region Blame 'Obama's Law' for Economic
Struggles,

CHRISTIAN

Sl.

MONITOR

(Apr.

25,

2011),

http://www.csmonitor.com/

World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0425/Congolese-living-in-mining-region-blame-Obama-slaw-for-economic-struggles (indicating that, even though the Dodd-Frank Act was not yet
in effect and did not call for an embargo, Kabila enacted an embargo "to show that he was
doing something" and that local Congolese blamed Obama and were "living in misery"
during the ban).
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Under the final rule promulgated on August 22, 2012, affected
companieS222 must compile data for calendar year 2013 and file their first
report by May 31, 2014.223 Although every SEC reporting company must
determine whether it uses conflict minerals, the rule applies to
companies only if "conflict minerals are necessary to the functionality or
production of a product" that a public company manufactures or
contracts to be manufactured. 2 24 First, a company must determine if its
products rely on conflict minerals.225 Next, a company must determine,
using a "reasonable country of origin inquiry," if minerals it uses may
have originated in the DRC or an adjoining country. 226 If the metals did
not originate in the covered nations or are considered scrap or recycled, a
company still must report how it determined that the metals were scrap
or recycled in a new specialized disclosure Form SD and provide a link to
the company's website providing the disclosure. 227 If a company has
reason to believe that the minerals may have come from a covered
nation, then the company must disclose on the Form SD whether the
company has determined the source to be "DRC conflict free," "not DRC
conflict free," or, for the next two years, "DRC conflict
undeterminable." 228 In addition, the company must obtain an
independent, private-sector, third-party audit of its conflict mineral
report of (1) the facilities used to process the conflict minerals; (2) the
country of origin; (3) the efforts used to determine the mines with
specificity; (4) the steps the company took to mitigate the risk that its
use of conflict minerals will benefit armed groups; and (5) any steps it
has taken to improve its due diligence process. 229 At this time, the OECD
Guidance is considered an acceptable third-party standard for due
diligence. 230 Because these reports are filed with the SEC, firms could be
222 The law provides important roles for the State and Commerce Departments as
well, but in the interest of space, this Article does not discuss those provisions.
223 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 249b).
224 Id. at 56,290. For the purposes of this Article, only a very brief description follows
of the law's requirements.
225 Id. at 56,310.
226 Id. at 56,275, 56,310.
227 Id. at 56,312, 56,315.
228 Id. at 56,333-34.
229 Id.
at 56,320-21. The SEC has granted a two-year transition period for
companies that cannot determine the country of origin or if the due diligence process
cannot determine if the minerals came from armed groups. These products would be
considered "DRC conflict undeterminable." For smaller companies, the SEC has granted a
four-year transition period. The company must still file a conflict mineral report but is not
required to file an audit report. Id. at 56,334.
230 Id. at 56,324.
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held liable for "false or misleading" statements under Section 18 of the
Exchange Act.231
IV. WILL THE CONFLICT MINERALS LEGISLATION SUCCEED, AND ARE
THERE MORE EFFECTWE WAYS TO END THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS?

A. The Law of Unintended Consequences
The SEC exists to "protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation." 232 When Congress
passed comprehensive securities legislation reform in 1933 and 1934, it
intended to ensure that publicly traded companies disclosed material
information to investors.233 But as discussed above, Section 1502's
legislative history makes it clear that the conflict mineral law is not
designed to protect or inform investors of material information but,
rather, to stop a humanitarian crisis.
The Dodd-Frank Act, however, is not the first time that the agency
has tackled social issues. In February 2010, the SEC issued guidance
regarding exposure and expenditures related to climate change.23 4
Although some public figures believed that the SEC had overstepped its
bounds then, 235 investors clearly have a right to know whether firms face
significant environmental regulation, litigation, or liabilities.
In the case of conflict minerals, although the Dodd-Frank Act does
not prohibit the use of these minerals, the law does require companies to
disclose whether they use them by May 2014.236 One company, Cisco, has
already received a shareholder's resolution asking for a feasibility study
to determine whether the minerals can be removed from Cisco's entire
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2006).
The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
233 See Securities Act of 1933, chap. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (2006)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, chap. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006)).
234 See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate
Change,
Securities Act Release No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61469, FR-82, 75 Fed. Reg.
6290 (Feb. 8, 2010); see also 17 C.F.R § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (2011).
235 See, e.g., John Broder, S.E.C. Adds Risk Related to Climate to Disclosure List,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2010, at Bi (quoting Commissioner Kathleen L. Casey as saying, "I
can only conclude that the purpose of this release is to place the imprimatur of the
commission on the agenda of the social and environmental policy lobby, an agenda that
falls outside of our expertise and beyond our fundamental mission of investor protection");
Editorial, Climate Change and the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at WK9 (expressing
the frustrations of Representative Joe Barton that the SEC should be focusing on "investor
protection" instead of promoting environmental groups' "social agendas").
236 Conflict Minerals, Release No. 67716 (Nov. 13, 2012).
231

232
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supply chain altogether. 237 This question posed by Cisco's shareholders
will not be the last as more socially responsible investors examine their
portfolios and the conflict minerals reports filed in 2014 and beyond. The
question compounds the fears of many of the law's opponents that firms
will determine that it is easier to source the minerals elsewhere, thereby
leaving artisanal miners with no livelihood whatsoever-similar to what
occurred during the 2010 Kabila embargo. Boards and executive
managers exercising appropriate risk management over the enterprise
must ask the question as to whether they should and could source their
minerals from other parts of the world.
As for return on shareholder value, the first academic study to
consider the issue found that legislators' and stakeholders' demands for
increased social transparency can have tangible costs to shareholders
when the disclosure rules induce significant changes in management and
customer decision making. 238 Again, assuming that similar results from
this preliminary study are replicated, responsible board members may
use this as another reason to source their materials elsewhere, removing
the source of income from the Congolese miners. Indeed, according to the
head of a regional mining provision in Congo, tens of thousands of
miners have already lost their jobs as companies have left the country,
and an architect of the U.N. due diligence procedures has admitted that
smuggling was still a problem as late as the end of 2012.239 Even the
OECD reported that many of the participants in its due diligence pilot
program found that many of its suppliers wanted to boycott the Congo
because of the law's requirements. 240

237 See Cisco Sys., Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Sch. 14A), 27 (Sept. 26, 2012).
238 See PAUL A. GRIFFIN ET AL., SUPPLY CHAIN SUSTAINABILITY: EVIDENCE ON
CONFLICT MINERALS, at ii (2012) ("Based on companies with conflict minerals
disclosures ... and a size- and industry-matched control sample of non-disclosers,....
shareholder value decreases for both samples for up to three weeks following the event
dates of the discloser companies."). It is too early to tell whether this will be replicated with
other companies as more companies make these disclosures, but these early findings may
raise concerns with board members.
239 See Katrina Manson, Central Africa: The Quest for Clean Hands, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 18, 2012, 8:40 PM), http://www.ft.comlintl/cms/s/O/b69124a4-394f-11e2-888100144feabdcO.html#axzz2HIfyFe5G.
240 OECD, Downstream Implementation of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas
Supplement on Tin, Tantalum, and Tungsten, 16 (2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/
daf/inv/mne/DDguidanceTTTpilotJan20l3.pdf.
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B. Does Complying with the Dodd-FrankAct Raise Other Compliance
Risks?
Even if Congo was not plagued with dozens of rebel groups and was
not in a state of civil war, corporations and their agents, auditors, and
suppliers attempting to comply in good faith with the Dodd-Frank Act
must contend with underpaid police officers, members of the military,
and bureaucrats who often expect to supplement their meager salaries
with bribes because they go for months without pay. 24 1 Transparency
International ranks Congo as the 160th most corrupt country out of 176
countries in the world. 242
Firms must also comply with both Section 1504, requiring TNCs to
publish what they pay to governments for access to oil, gas, and
minerals,243 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), which has
no affirmative defense for the actions of a rogue agent or employee even
if a company has provided explicit training or instructions to comply
with the law.244 Section 1504 ostensibly covers both legal and illegal
payments. The FCPA has two main provisions. First, it prohibits bribery
of foreign officials.245 Second, it requires companies to keep accurate
books and records. 246 Some TNCs must also comply with the United
Kingdom's Bribery Act of 2010, which imposes strict liability for bribing
a "foreign public official." 2 47
Given all of the steps and all of the people involved within the
supply chain, there are significant risks that TNCs acting in good faith
will have agents who, in following local customs, may violate U.S., U.K.,
and other laws just to get clients' products out of the country, regardless
of the TNC's instructions to the contrary. Even with exercising due
diligence, ensuring that bribes are not used may be practically
impossible when tracing the route of gold, for example, from artisanal
miners digging gold by hand from river beds or minerals from the mines
to the middle men and those transporting bags of minerals from villages
to cities through various countries to boats to refineries or smelters in
241 Even the U.N. peacekeepers are not immune. During a research trip to Bukavu,
DRC, in September 2011, the author personally witnessed U.N. personnel trading bags of
minerals for donated clothes with miners. The clothes were supposed to be given to the
miners and local villagers for free.
242 Corruption by Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo, TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
http://www.transparency.org/country#COD (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
243 Dodd-Frank Act § 1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
244 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff
(2006).
245 § 78dd-1(a).
246 Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
247 Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, §§ 6(1), 7(1) (U.K.).
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Asia (where there may also be corruption issues).248 It is unlikely that
these kinds of payments would constitute the "facilitating payments"
allowed under certain circumstances by the FCPA, but which are still
frowned upon by the OECD and illegal in almost every country in the
world. 249
Violating the FCPA has significant civil and criminal penalties that
can also lead to debarment from government contracts as well as
worldwide jurisdictional enforcement. 250 The Department of Justice and
the SEC have made enforcement of the anti-bribery statutes a key
priority and have even allowed a whistleblower "bounty" of 10-30% of
recoveries over one million dollars. 251 Thus, boards considering the best
interests of their shareholders would likely weigh the risks of being able
to get accurate certifications and disclosures to their investors and
consumers and the reputational concerns of doing business in the Congo.
Again, they may determine that it is in their best interests to do
business elsewhere, further exacerbating the plights of the local
Congolese. 25 2

248 This is a such a well-founded concern that companies like KPMG, an audit, tax

and advisory firm, warn clients of the stages during the mining and transportation
processes at which bribery and smuggling can occur based on OECD and other sources.
See, e.g., KPMG INT'L, CONFLICT MINERALS AND BEYOND: PART Two: A MORE TRANSPARENT

SUPPLY CHAIN 6-7 (2012), available at http://www.kpmg.comfUS/en/IssuesAndInsights/
ArticlesPublications/Documents/more-transparent-supply-chain.pdf.
249 Facilitating payments for routine, nondiscretionary tasks is allowed under 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (2006). However, only Australia, Canada, South Korea, the United
States, and New Zealand allow them. TRACE ANTI-BRIBERY COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS,
TRACE FACILITATIONS PAYMENTS BENCHMARKING SURVEY 2 (2009), available at

https://secure.traceinternational.org/data/public/documents/FacilitationPaymentsSurveyRe
sults-64622-1.pdf. In November 2009, the OECD called for a ban on them to help prevent
and detect foreign bribery. See OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Further
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, at
§ VI(ii) (2009), available at http://www.oeed.org/dataoecd/11/40/44176910.pdf. The United
States is a signatory to the OECD Convention Against Bribery, and, therefore, the use may
be limited even further in the future.
250 See Marcia Narine, Whistleblowers and Rogues: The Urgent Call for an
Affirmative Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming fall
2013).
251 Welcome to the Office of the Whistleblower, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
252 European and Asian companies that do not issue securities in the United States
would have no such constraints and could still do business in the Congo. The European
Union is likely to implement legislation in the near future on conflict minerals using the
OECD Guidance under pressure from NGOs. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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C. The Kimberley Process and the Clean Diamond Trade Act
A number of critics of Section 1502 have argued that a better
solution for the crisis in the Congo would have been something akin to
the Kimberley Process 25 3 and the Clean Diamond Trade Act ("CDTA").254
In 2000, the U.N. adopted a process to unite the worldwide community to
eradicate the funding of rebels in Angola and Sierra Leone through
conflict diamonds. 255 In response, the Kimberley Process began in 2003
as a joint initiative by governments, civil society organizations, and
industries to stem the flow of conflict diamonds into commerce and, like
conflict minerals legislation, is meant to stop funding to rebel groups. 256
There are fifty-four participants from eighty countries, and each
participant must implement legislation and controls, which have,
according to the founders, reduced the number of conflict diamonds to
1% of diamonds in international trade. 257 The United States has enacted
the CDTA, which prevents importation and exportation of any diamond
that does not come through the Kimberley Process and subjects violators
to civil and criminal penalties.258
Neither of these, however, are an ideal substitute for the DoddFrank Act. First, like many of the initiatives discussed earlier,
membership in the Kimberley Process is voluntary. Although countries
can be expelled if they do not comply, they must agree to be reviewed,
there are no real penalties for transgressions, and there is no
international enforcement.259 The GAO has also determined that the
253 KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com (last visited
Mar. 8,
2013) ('The Kimberley Process (KP) is a joint government[, industry and civil society
initiative to stem the flow of conflict diamonds-rough diamonds used by rebel movements
to finance wars against legitimate governments.").
254 Clean Diamond Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 108-19, 117 Stat. 631 (2003) (codified at
19 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3913 (2006)) (stating that one of the Acts purposes is "to stop trade in
conflict diamonds"); see also Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC's
New Role as Diplomatic and HumanitarianWatchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1345-51
(2012) (arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act will cause more harm than good and that more
efficient regulatory models include the Clean Diamond Trade Act and Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme); Shannon Raj, Note, Blood Electronics: Congo's Conflict Minerals
and the Legislation That Could Cleanse the Trade, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 981, 994-1000 (2011)
(claiming that the government should have followed a customs-based approach similar to a
Kimberley Process-style certification instead of using the SEC to enforce conflict minerals).
255 G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. Doc. AIRES/55/56 (Dec. 1, 2000).
256 See KP Basics, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/
kimberley-process/kp-basics (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
257

Id.

19 U.S.C. § 3903(a) (2006).
See Shannon K. Murphy, Clouded Diamonds: Without Binding Arbitration and
More Sophisticated Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, the Kimberley Process Will Ultimately
Fail in Ending Conflicts Fueled by Blood Diamonds, 11 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 207, 218258

259
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United States does not adequately enforce the CDTA or inspect diamond
shipments under the Kimberley Process.260 Global Witness, one of the
advocates for the conflict minerals legislation and a co-nominee for the
Nobel Prize for its work on conflict diamonds in 2003,261 disassociated
itself with the Kimberley Process in 2011 because the NGO determined
that "[t]he Kimberley Process's refusal to evolve and address the clear
links between diamonds, violence and tyranny has rendered it
increasingly outdated." 262 Global Witness was particularly frustrated
with the failure of the Kimberley Process in Venezuela, Cote d'Ivoire,
and Zimbabwe, which it believed were still involved in inappropriate
smuggling activities. 263
At first blush, there is an appeal to rallying the world community to
take action, particularly the European Union, which has not yet acted on
conflict minerals legislation. While some action is better than none, the
Kimberley Process and the CDTA have achieved less than optimal
effectiveness. 264 Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that a
multinational or customs-based regime modeled on existing schemes
would be any more effective in enforcing a conflict minerals law.

D. Legal Challenges to the Law's Ultimate Success
In October 2012, the National Association of Manufacturers,
Business Roundtable, and the Chamber of Commerce petitioned the D.C.
Circuit for a review of the SEC's rule.265 The parties argued, among other
things, that the agency (1) failed to conduct an appropriate cost benefit
20 (2011) (expressing concern over the voluntary nature of the Kimberley Process and the
fact that countries face no repercussions for ignoring recommendations). But see Joseph
Hummel, Diamonds Are a Smuggler's Best Friend: Regulation, Economics, and
Enforcement in the Global Effort to Curb the Trade in Conflict Diamonds, 41 INT'L LAW.
that
1145, 1160 (2007) ("If a country does not comply with the Kimberley Process ....
country could be made subject to an investigation or face expulsion from certain diamond
industry institutions.").
260 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-978, CONFLICT DIAMONDS: AGENCY
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN DIAMOND TRADE ACT 21
(2006).
261 Nobel Prize, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/node/4097
(last
visited Mar. 8, 2013).
262 Press Release, Global Witness, Global Witness Leaves Kimberley Process, Calls
for Diamond Trade to be Held Accountable (Dec. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library[KPexity.pdf.
263 See id.
264 See Raj, supra note 254, at 997 ("In sum, without accountability, without a
private right of action, and critically, without an independent monitoring system to ensure
compliance, the Kimberley Process remains far less effective than it could and should be.").
265 Petition for Review, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19,
2012).
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analysis as required under the Administrative Procedures Act; (2) failed
to exercise appropriate judgment by arbitrarily refusing to impose less
burdensome requirements; (3) erroneously concluded that it could not
create a de minimis exception to the rule; (4) created an unreasonably
stringent "reasonable country of origin inquiry"; (5) should not have
extended the rule to those who contract with others for the manufacture
of products; (6) should have extended the same longer phase in period to
larger companies as it did to smaller companies since the larger
companies depend on smaller companies for disclosure purposes; and (7)
created a rule that violated the First Amendment by requiring
companies to stigmatize themselves by implicating themselves in human
rights abuses.266 An amicus brief filed by the author, Ambassador
Jendayi Frazer, and Dr. Peter Pham argued that the law would
negatively impact the Congolese people for many of the reasons stated in
this Article, among others. 267 An industry coalition filed an amicus brief
in support of the Petitioners citing examples of the kinds of problems
caused by the failure to allow a de minimis exception and the lack of
definitional certainty around certain terms both for themselves and their
suppliers.268 The SEC responded to the Petitioners and amici's
arguments asserting that the agency does not have the authority to
second guess congressional judgment about the humanitarian crisis in
Congo or to propose alternatives that reduce costs that would undermine
Congress's intent.269

266 Opening Brief of Petitioners at 23-24, Nat 7Assn of Mfrs., No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 16, 2013).
267 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo
in
Support of Petitioners, Nat'l Assn of Mfrs., No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2013).
268 See Industry Coalition Amici Brief in Support of Petitioners,
Nat? Assn of Mfrs.,
No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2013).
269 See Initial Brief of the SEC, Respondent 2-3. Nat'l Assn of Mfrs., No.
12-1422
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 2013). Nonetheless, as the Petitioner's Brief notes, the dissents of
Commissioners Gallagher and Paredes during the rulemaking process belie this argument.
See Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 266, at 22-23. Commissioner Gallagher
stated, 'The statutory framework that establishes the SEC's economic analysis obligations
does not permit the agency to infer benefits." Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Proposed
Rule to Implement Section 1502 of the Dodd-FrankAct-the "Conflict Minerals"Provision
by Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (August 22, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speechI2012/spchO82212dmg-minerals.htm.
In
his
dissent,
Commissioner Paredes noted that "the agency still must base its final rule on a reasoned
assessment that considers the potential consequences of its judgments. Otherwise, one
cannot determine whether the rule is likely to do more good than harm." Statement at
Open Meeting to Adopt a FinalRule Regarding Conflict Minerals Pursuant to Section 1502
of the Dodd-Frank Act by Commissioner Troy A Paredes, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N
(August 22, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spchO82212tap-minerals.htm. As
of the time of this writing, the case had not been decided.
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Many companies, perhaps hoping that the two-year delay in
implementation would lead to the law's demise or at least significant
compromise, have made little to no effort to comply. 270 On the other
hand, some companies have made significant progress in bringing
transparency to mineral sourcing.2 71 Many TNCs also participate in "the
Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade, a joint initiative
by the Department of State and the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), formed on November 15, 2011," to
harmonize strategies between stakeholders in order to promote a
conflict-free supply chain for minerals. 272
Some TNCs are members of socially conscious industry groups such
as the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition ("EICC")273 and the
Global e-Sustainability Initiative ("GeSI"). 274 EICC and GeSI have been
working toward developing industry-wide schemes to implement Section
1502. Because some of these member companies are simultaneously
members of the Petitioners in the action for review of the conflict
minerals legislation, organizations such as Global Witness have argued
that their membership is at odds with their participation in addressing
conflict minerals issues and have called on them to clarify their positions
regarding the lawsuit.275 As of the time of this writing, the D.C. Circuit
Court had not ruled on the merits of the lawsuit, and affected companies
were moving forward with the implementation of the rule's
requirements.
In any event, corporations should expect questions about
transparency in their supply chains because consumers, investors, and
municipalities will continue to demand it regardless of the success of

270 SASHA LEZHNEV & ALEX HELLMUTH, ENOUGH PROJECT, TAKING CONFLICT OUT OF
GADGETS: COMPANY RANKINGS ON CONFLICT MINERALS 2012, at 1 (2012),

CONSUMER

available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CorporateRankings2012.pdf.
271 Id.
272 Launch of Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade, U.S. INST.
http://www.usip.org/events/launch-public-private-alliance-responsible-mineralsPEACE,
trade (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
273 EICC is a coalition of electronics companies that works to improve social,
environmental, and ethical responsibility. About Us, ELECTRONIC INDUSTRY CITIZENSHIP
COALITION, http://www.eicc.info/about-us.shtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
274 GeSI provides "resources and best practices for achieving integrated social and
environmental sustainability" to information and communication technology companies.
Overview, GLOBAL E-SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVE, http://gesi.org/AboutICT sustainability
(last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
275 Companies Must Take Clear Position on Legal Threat to Conflict Minerals
Provision, GLOBAL WITNESS (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.globalwitness.org/library/
companies-must-take-clear-position-legal-threat-conflict-minerals-provision.

2013]

FROM KANSAS TO THE CONGO

399

Section 1502.276 A number of cities and dozens of college campuses have
indicated their "preference" to do business with companies that are
"conflict-free" or to consider that status as a factor in purchasing.277 The

age of name-and-shame is clearly here to stay, and there will continue to
be consequences in the human rights arena even beyond the DoddFrank Act.
CONCLUSION

Many well-meaning advocates in civil society and Congress have
tried to bring attention to the deadliest conflict since World War II for
years but to no avail. Perhaps faced with no other options to get the
world's attention, the NGO community has done an effective job of
repackaging the crisis in the Congo into a simple narrative of rape as a
weapon of war perpetrated by rebels, fueled by consumer demand for
electronics, and funded by corporations buying minerals. 278 This
oversimplified narrative has led to a number of proposed "solutions," one

of which is the well-intentioned, but misguided, Dodd-Frank conflict
minerals legislation. Fortunately, those NGOs and legislators have not
given up on other proposals, and they argue that, while the Dodd-Frank
Act may not be perfect, at least it is a start. NGOs know that reputationsensitive corporations that spend millions building their brands can illafford to be affiliated with rebel forces raping innocent women and
children.
Whether a firm's board of directors uses a shareholder or
stakeholder view, it must conduct a cost-benefit analysis, even if, as the
petitioners who have filed suit against the SEC allege, the agency failed
276 Even if the litigation does not succeed, the President may also terminate the
requirements of Section 1502 after 2015 upon a determination "that no armed groups
continue to be directly involved and benefitting from commercial activity involving conflict
minerals." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(4) (Supp. V 2011).
277 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Edina, Minnesota; and St. Petersburg, Florida, have
passed conflict-free city resolutions indicating their preference to buy from companies that
have conflict-free
products.
Conflict-Free Cities, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO,
http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/conflict-free-cities (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). A
number of colleges have also passed resolutions or made public statements that they have
a preference for purchasing from companies that have conflict-free products, but they have
not made divestment decisions yet. Participating Schools, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO,
http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/participating-schools (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
It remains to be seen what effect the official conflict minerals reports will have on the
university investment decisions once those are released.
278 But see S6verine Autesserre, Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the
Congo and Their Unintended Consequences, 111 AFR. AFF. 202, 204 (2012) ("While . . . the
interveners had good reasons for adopting dominant, simple narratives, and for focusing on
three of them [illegal exploitation of resources, sexual abuse, and extension of state
authority], ... this adoption had some positive results, but was damaging overall.").

400

REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:351

to thoroughly conduct its own. Under a more restrictive shareholder
view, reasonable board members may seek to source minerals elsewhere
as they consider the actual monetary costs of compliance; the legal risks
related to ensuring that agents conform to their mandates related to the
FCPA, the U.K. Bribery Act, and Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act;
and the calls for greater transparency from socially responsible
investors.
Under a more expansive stakeholder view, looking at the affected
community of the local Congolese, the firm needs to ask itself a few
questions. Assuming that consumers will pay attention to the disclosures
and will actually change their purchasing decisions (and that is not at all
clear), can the firm withstand a boycott? What will the reputational risk
be to the CSR program? Is it more socially responsible to source minerals
in the Congo and to try to solve an intractable crisis that the
international community seems unable or unwilling to resolve when the
evidence shows that the legislation has already had adverse effects and
the corruption leaves doubts as to the viability of the process? Will the
firm become complicit in the human rights crisis, given the evidence that
civilians, members of the military, the police force, and the rebels
participate in rape, looting, and violence and that members of the
military also profit from trafficking in minerals? Is the socially
responsible action to source the minerals from other countries even if it
devastates the livelihoods of local Congolese if the companies no longer
source their minerals from the DRC?
The final question is for Congress and the SEC. Is a corporate
governance disclosure the right solution to a human rights crisis? Here
the government has asked the SEC to address a geopolitical agenda that
it is not equipped to manage. 279 While well-intentioned members of
Congress capitalized on the Dodd-Frank Act to pass their stand-alone
bills on conflict minerals, they would have better served the Congolese
by focusing on true implementation of the DRC Act, which most of the
NGOs advocating for the Dodd-Frank Act would have preferred.
Delaying the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act would be the
responsible and humane thing to do given what is at stake. The delay
would allow time for: (1) an appropriate cost-benefit analysis; (2) the
European Union and Canada to develop their own parallel legislation;
and (3) a re-evaluation to be conducted with the input of affected groups
in the Congo. If the court allows the law to stand as it is, this law will
279 See generally Celia R. Taylor, Conflict Minerals and SEC Disclosure Regulation,
2 HARv. Bus. L. REV. ONLINE 105 (2012), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/01/Taylor-Conflict-Minerals.pdf (discussing the role of disclosure regulation and why
the Dodd-Frank Act goes too far).
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not "save lives" as Senator Brownback had hoped. To the contrary, it
may continue to cost both livelihoods and lives.

